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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigates the reasons behind international price dispersion. 
The first essay, “International Price Dispersion and the Direction of Trade”, discusses the 
importance of trade cost as a determinant of international price dispersion. The 
importance of trade costs in segmenting product markets can not be captured by 
considering aggregate prices or in the absence of information on the direction of trade. 
The first essay, addresses this problem by utilizing product-specific prices along with 
cross-sectional productivity measures and bilateral trade flows that allow us to identify 
the probable source of any one product. The empirical approach used in this work is in 
line with the theoretical framework of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and the variation of this 
model proposed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). The data are shown to be 
consistent with this framework. In particular, trade costs in the form of transportation and 
distribution costs are important in determining international price differences and 
segmenting international markets. 
The second essay, “International Price Dispersion and Market Structure” 
investigates the effect of market structure on absolute price differences. Cheung, Chinn 
and Fuji (1999) argue that, monopolistic firm’s pricing power is determined by the 
elasticity of demand which depends on the substitutability among varieties within the 
industry.  Therefore, product differentiation creates more dispersed prices and it can be a 
sign of market power. In this essay, market structure is controlled by using the product 
classification proposed by Rauch (1999). Specifically, the data is divided into two 
separate good categories as homogeneous goods and differentiated goods.  The results 
 xi 
presented in this chapter demonstrate that the effect of potential determinants of 
international price dispersion differs substantially for different product types.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The law-of-one-price (LOP) states that, once the prices expressed in common 
currency units, identical goods in different countries should have identical prices. 
Purchasing power parity (PPP) states that LOP should hold on average.  The conclusion 
that prices of the same goods when expressed in the same currency units fail to equalize 
across locations is considered as a sign that markets are not perfectly integrated (Chen, 
2002). This dissertation is a combination of two essays which empirically investigate the 
reasons behind international price dispersion. Although due to data limitations most 
empirical work has examined the time-series distribution of international relative prices, 
Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2005) state that both LOP and PPP are about the cross-
sectional distribution, and they propose the use of price level data that enable us to make 
comparisons across locations. Following the above-mentioned work, I utilize 
microeconomic price levels in order to infer the reasons behind international price 
dispersion. The dataset originates from EUROSTAT surveys and contains retail prices for 
a broad set of goods and services within the EU countries for the years 1975, 1980, 1985 
and 1990.  The level of detail in this dataset allows exact comparisons across space at a 
given point in time, hence enabling a through investigation which can go deeper in a 
disaggregate sense as to the reasons responsible for price dispersion. 
The first essay, “International Price Dispersion and the Direction of Trade”, is 
firmly motivated by the theoretical framework discussed in Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2004). Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) argue that the death of distance is exaggerated 
  
 
2 
and that trade costs are large even between highly integrated economies, suggesting some 
useful hypotheses for understanding these.  According to the authors, direct evidence on 
trade costs which comes from costs imposed by policy (tariffs, quotas and the like) and 
costs imposed by the environment (transportation (freight) cost, insurance and time cost) 
are the first best alternatives to use, but not always feasible due to data limitations and the 
very large size of the resulting datasets. Therefore indirect sources along with a 
theoretical approach are necessary and inevitable in order to infer the large portion of 
trade costs. Prices of goods can provide an indirect source of information about the 
magnitude of trade costs (Anderson and van Wincoop 2004). 
In the theoretical framework established in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), 
international price dispersion is determined by trade costs made up of transportation and 
local distribution costs, differences in taxes, markups and good specific characteristics. I 
utilize physical distance between countries as a measure for transportation cost and 
income per-capita and industry-specific real wage rates as a measure for local distribution 
cost. Heterogeneity across industries in transportation costs and local distribution costs 
are controlled by industry-specific tradability and the non-traded input share variables, 
respectively. Tax differences are controlled by good-specific dummies for the group of 
goods for which we have a-priori information about large tax differences across countries 
and value added tax (VAT) rates differences. 
Finally, according to this model variable markups also affect price differences. 
Markups depend on factors such as the price elasticity of demand and market share of the 
producer. Calculation of markups is somewhat problematic since marginal cost of 
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production is an unobservable variable.  Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) argue that 
larger markets are more competitive, and in more competitive markets producers must 
recover their fixed costs by selling more at lower markups. Similarly, due to Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2005), market size affects the toughness of competition. Bigger markets 
exhibit higher levels of product variety and host more productive firms that set lower 
markups and lower prices. By following these arguments, we utilize population size 
differences to capture market size and hence differences in markups. 
 In order to extract information about trade costs from price data, Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2004) propose the use of price level data. Moreover, they argue that the 
natural strategy should be to identify the source country for each product. We use two 
different approaches in order to identify the most likely source of each product in the 
data. In our first approach, information on country and industry-specific productivities is 
used along with the good specific price levels. More specifically, we rank the countries 
according to their level of productivity for each industry, and compute the product-
specific price differences relative to the most productive country in each industry. This 
approach is consistent with Eaton and Kortum (2001), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and 
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) where the most productive country for each 
product is the sole exporter of it to the rest of the world. 
As an alternative approach, we consider industry-specific bilateral trade flows and 
use data from the importer country’s real trade partners in order to generate the 
information as a weighted average of the real trade partners’ data for a “hypothetical” 
source country and for each product in our sample.  Utilizing industry-specific bilateral 
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trade information allows us to take into consideration that the same type of good can be 
exported by more than one country within the sample. 
The results in both approaches indicate that identifying the source country makes 
it possible to consider price comparisons that are relevant to trade costs. Overall, data is 
consistent with the theoretical model discussed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) in 
which price dispersion is determined by trade costs, good-specific characteristics, taxes 
and markup differences. 
The second essay, “International Price Dispersion and Market Structure” 
investigates the effect of market structure on absolute price dispersion. Specifically we 
attempt to distinguish the effect of potential determinants of international price dispersion 
discussed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) on different product types. 
According to Cheung, Chinn and Fuji (1999), a monopolistically competitive 
firm’s pricing decision depends on the elasticity of demand which is in turn determined 
by the number of close substitutes to the good in the market. Therefore, product 
differentiation can be a sign of market power. 
In order to classify goods in our data, we use the commodity classification 
proposed by Rauch (1999). In the Rauch classification, internationally traded 
commodities can be classified as goods traded in organized exchanges, goods that are not 
traded in organized exchanges nevertheless possess a “reference price”, and finally 
differentiated goods. Commodities that belong to the first and second groups are 
homogeneous goods since having a reference price distinguishes homogeneous goods 
from the differentiated ones (Rauch, 1999). 
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The first specification in this essay based on the model used by Crucini, Telmer 
and Zachariadis (2005), and analyzes the effect of market structure on good-by-good 
price dispersion. According to this model, international price dispersion is determined by 
the extent to which final goods are traded, and the share of the non-traded input in the 
total cost. Taxes are controlled by VAT differences and good-specific dummy variables 
for vices (tobacco products and alcoholic beverages) and large cars. Results confirmed 
that tradability of good is negatively, and the non-traded input share is positively related 
with international price dispersion. Moreover, results demonstrate larger impact of both 
variables for homogeneous goods. 
The second model based on the theoretical discussion in Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2004). As we have already discussed above, according to this model, 
international prices differ to the extent of trade costs, good characteristics, taxes and 
finally markup differences.  In this essay, we attempt to infer the effects of potential 
determinants for different commodity types. Results show that homogeneous goods have 
higher price elasticity of distance and local distribution cost and markup differences have 
larger impact on differentiated goods. Furthermore, our results support the argument 
made by Rauch (1999) and Barthelon and Freund (2004): The price elasticity of distance 
decreases monotonically over the period for differentiated goods, but we do not observe a 
similar trend for homogeneous goods. So, it can be concluded that, decrease in search 
costs over the years affects the trade and prices of differentiated goods more than 
homogeneous goods. In short, our results make it clear that the effect of potential 
determinants of international price dispersion differs substantially for different product 
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types. Since product differentiation is used in order to control the effect of market 
structure, these results demonstrate that market structure has an important impact on 
international price dispersion. 
Overall, results presented in this dissertation indicate that international price 
dispersion is largely determined by transportation cost, local distribution costs, good 
characteristics, taxes and differences in markups and heterogeneity across different 
product categories should be considered in future work in this literature 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTERNATIONAL PRICE DISPERSION AND THE DIRECTION OF 
TRADE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2005) (CTZ) make the case that Law-of-One –
Price (LOP) and Purchasing Power Parity are essentially about the cross-sectional 
distribution of  international relative prices rather than about the time-series behavior of 
changes in these relative prices, and that “economic theory places much starker 
restrictions on LOP deviations than on their changes”; the implication being that the gap 
between theory and empirics can be bridged through the use of microeconomic price 
levels that enable exact comparisons across locations. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) 
propose the use of price level data that are comparable across locations at a point in time 
as a promising route for inferring trade cost levels, arguing that “it is hard to see how 
information can be extracted about the level of trade costs from evidence on changes in 
relative prices.” They go on to suggest that in order to extract information about trade 
costs from price levels “ a natural strategy would be to identify the source country for 
each product,” noting that “ unfortunately survey data often do not tell us which country 
produced the good.” 
In this paper, we consider microeconomic price levels along with the information 
on productivity of each country in each industry which we use in order to identify the 
most likely source for each product. This is consistent with the models of Eaton and 
Kortum (2001), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum 
  
 
8 
(2003) where the most productive country for any one product is the sole source of that 
product to the rest of the world. As an alternative identification strategy, we consider 
industry-specific bilateral trade flows in order to determine the price of the product in the 
hypothetical source as a weighted average of the prices of an importing country’s actual 
trading partners. Utilizing trade flows, allows us to consider price comparisons for each 
product consumed in the importing country relative to countries that are likely to be a 
source for that product.  
We consider a variation of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model proposed in 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). In this framework, international price dispersion is 
determined by transport costs, local trade (distribution) costs, taxes, good-specific 
characteristics, and differences in markups. We use geographic distance as a measure of 
transport costs and also allow for industry variation in these. We account for local trade 
costs through income per capita differences as in Crucini, Telmer, and Zachariadis 
(2004), and also consider industry-specific features of local costs as captured by the non-
traded factor input content measure used in CTZ and by country-industry-specific real 
wage rates. Differences in taxes across goods are captured by group-specific dummies for 
classes of goods that are likely to face higher taxes and, where broadly available, by 
considering VAT levels for different goods and countries. Finally, we assume that the 
larger markets tend to be more competitive so that demand elasticities are higher and 
markups lower there, and utilize population size to capture market size as an approximate 
inverse measure of the markup. 
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Transport costs and broader trade costs are of central importance in many 
macroeconomic models.1 However, assessing these costs at the macroeconomic level has 
proved to be problematic. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) argue persuasively that 
“average price dispersion measures are not very informative about trade costs.” In 
general, the impact of trade costs in segmenting individual product markets will be 
underestimated while considering aggregate prices or the average (over products) of price 
deviations. When aggregate prices or mean price deviations are considered, it is likely 
that countries both export and import to and from each other some of the goods that go 
into the construction of the composite price. As a result, the impact of trade costs on price 
differences could wash out on average even if trade costs were important in segmenting 
markets as determinants of international price deviations for individual products. This is 
the “averaging-out property” put forth by Crucini, Telmer, and Zachariadis (2004). 
Trade costs will again be mismeasured in the absence of information regarding 
the source of the product being compared across locations. Even when internationally 
comparable prices of individual products are available, the lack of information about the 
source of particular products makes it difficult to infer trade costs.2 For instance, 
transport costs would be mismeasured since the distance between the two countries does 
not necessarily capture distance between exporter and importer. If trade between two 
countries does not occur for a certain product, then that price difference shall lie between 
                                               
1
 For instance, Atkeson and Burstein (2004) consider a theoretical model where trade costs are essential in 
explaining the time series relation between international relative prices of tradable goods and the real 
exchange rate. 
 
2
 This might be behind the finding in Anderson and Smith (2004) and elsewhere of a small or non-existent 
average impact of transport costs, captured by physical distance, on deviations from LOP. 
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the no-arbitrage bounds and will be less than the trade cost.3 On the other hand, if both 
countries export the product to each other, the overall impact of trade cost on that 
product’s price difference between these two countries can be zero even if these costs are 
positive and large for each country. A bilateral price difference truly reflects the size of 
trade costs when only one of the countries being compared is the source of that product to 
the other.  
In this paper, we aim to resolve the abovementioned problems by utilizing 
product-specific international price differences along with cross-sectional productivity 
indices and bilateral trade flows between countries to identify the likely source of any one 
product. Utilizing the unique –in terms of breadth of the goods covered and their exact 
comparability across locations- microeconomic dataset of absolute prices across the 
European Union from CTZ along with information on the direction of trade, we identify 
economically meaningful measures of trade costs in general, and transport costs in 
particular through their estimated impact on product-specific retail price differences 
between importing and source countries.4 
We find that country-specific aspects of transport costs measured by geographic 
distance, and distribution costs measured by real income per capita, are important in 
explaining deviations from the law of one price and absolute price dispersion. In addition, 
                                               
3
 Since the average trade cost between countries that do not trade with each other is likely to be greater than 
between those that do, the price gap is likely to be greater between locations that do not trade even though 
this falls within the bounds determined by trade costs. 
 
4
 Trade across these European countries is less likely to be characterized by high policy-related and other 
unidentified trade barriers, enabling us to better capture transport costs via a geographic distance measure. 
However, to the extend that transport costs across these countries are relatively less important, our 
estimates of these are a lower bound for average transport costs characterizing world trade. 
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industry-specific transport costs as measured by the local cost content of final products 
are shown to be important in determining absolute price dispersion across countries. 
Overall, the data are consistent with models where transport costs and differences in 
distribution costs, retail taxes, and market size play important roles in the determination 
of international retail price differences. 
The importance of trade costs in relation to international quantity flows and 
international price dispersion has been emphasized in the recent work of Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2004) and Hummels (1999). However, there is little in terms of empirical 
work that examines price dispersion and the direction of trade within a unified 
framework.5 Heterogeneity in trade costs and productivity and the interaction between 
these are central to the quantity and price implications of a number of recent papers. For 
example, in the model of Bergin, Glick, and Taylor (forthcoming), heterogeneity in trade 
costs and productivity across goods may reverse the usual Balassa-Samuelson effect if 
the productivity advantage relates to goods with high trade costs. Benigno and 
Thoenissen (2003) consider the impact of total factor productivity (TFP) shocks in a 
theoretical environment that allows for home bias and market segmentation, where 
productivity advantage is consistent with lower domestic price level since domestically 
produced goods comprise a larger fraction of domestic consumption than foreign 
consumption. Here we allow for and utilize productivity heterogeneity across industries. 
                                               
5
 The model in Eaton and Kortum (2002) has implications for both international price dispersion and 
quantity flows but has not been fully explored empirically. Bergin and Glick (2005) consider a model of 
firm heterogeneity in per unit costs of trade where reductions in fixed cost of trade or per unit tariffs have 
differential effects on price dispersion. They then use this model to explain the apparently contradictory 
observations that “while quantities of trade have increased significantly, especially for previously non-
traded goods, “there has been limited or negative price convergence.” 
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Our identification strategy is consistent with lower product prices in countries that have 
higher productivity in that industry. Finally, we explore the issue of industry 
heterogeneity in transport costs and show that our estimates of the latter are consistent 
with common measures of tradability. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the 
unique dataset of microeconomic prices from CTZ and the construction of cross-sectional 
TFP indices and trade-weighted relative prices. Section 2.3 offers the theoretical 
motivation behind our empirical application pursued here. Section 2.4 briefly concludes. 
2.2 Data Description 
Let’s denote pij as the local currency price of good I in country j, pik as the local 
price of the same good in country k, and ejk as the nominal exchange rate of country j in 
terms of currency units of country k. then we can define law-of-one price deviations as 
( )ln ln /ijk jk ij ikq e p p=                                          (2.1) 
We use the same retail price data as CTZ.6 A detailed description of the data is 
provided in the latter paper.7 These data originates from Eurostat surveys conducted in 
different European cities sampled at five year intervals between 1975 and 1990. The level 
of detail often goes down to the level of the same brand sampled across locations and 
enables exact comparisons across space at a given point in time. The price data for each 
cross-section is collected in a sequence of surveys where the same group of goods is 
                                               
6
 We take from CTZ the common currency prices with the outliers having being removed. CTZ remove the 
price entry for a good in a certain country when the price in that country differs by a factor of five from the 
average common currency price for that good across countries. 
 
7
 A comprehensive list of the goods is available at http://bertha.tepper.cmu.edu/eurostat 
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collected within the same period for all countries.8 The Eurostat survey covers nine 
countries for 658 goods in 1975, 12 countries for 1090 goods in 1980, and 13 countries 
for 1805 and 1896 goods respectively for 1985 and 1990. The nine EU countries in the 
1975 survey are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, and the UK. Greece, Portugal and Spain are added in 1980 and Austria in 
1985. 
Each good was assigned to a three-digit industry to be mapped into the industry-
specific measures of the non-traded input share, tradability, and the real wage rate, as 
well as to TFP and bilateral import flows the construction of which is discussed in the 
next few paragraphs. The non-traded input share of the good is the ratio of non-traded 
input costs to total cost for each industry. Non-traded inputs are assumed to include: 
utilities, construction, distribution, hotels, catering, railways, road transport, sea transport, 
air transport, transport services, telecommunications, banking, finance, insurance, 
business services, education, health and other services. This measure is taken directly 
from CTZ who compute it using the 1988 input-output tables of the UK. The tradeability 
for each industry is measured as the ratio of total industry trade between countries in the 
sample divided by total output of that industry across the same countries, as in CTZ.9 We 
use three-year averages of tradeability using two preceding years along with the cross-
sections sampling years in order to limit measurement error issues. 
                                               
8
 In what CTZ call “1985”, for instance, the prices of most services were collected in September-October 
1985, while prices of most clothing items were collected in December of 1984. The nominal exchange rate 
data with which prices were converted into a common currency takes explicit account of this timing, taking 
the form of averages of daily data over the relevant time intervals, 
 
9
 Both shares are listed in detail in tables A1 and A2 in the data appendix in CTZ (2005). 
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The distance measure utilized here is the greatest circle distance between the 
airports of the capital cities and is measured in kilometers. The capital city of each 
country is the sampling location of the price data for all countries but Germany for which 
the reported prices are an average from a number of cities within that country. Thus, for 
Germany, we use distance relative top Frankfurt, a geographic and economic center. 
Population and real GDP per capita are obtained from PWT 6.1 for each of the cross-
sections. The latter measure is the constant price chain series GDP per capita with the 
code name rgdpch. 
We also use data on VAT rates for 23 different categories of goods and services 
for all countries in our sample in 1990. For 1975, 1980 and 1985 VAT is not observed for 
Greece, which entered the European Community (EC) in 1980, and for Portugal, and 
Spain which entered the EC in 1985. This is the same VAT data as in CTZ, assembled 
from the European commission publication “VAT rates applied in the member states of 
the European Community” (2002), the OECD publication “Taxing Consumption, and the 
Ernst and Young publication “VAT and Sales Taxes Worldwide: A Guide to Practice and 
Procedures in 61 Countries” (1996). 
Data required for TFP calculation come from two World Bank sources: the Trade 
and Production Database on investment and Capital for Agriculture and Manufacturing. 
The Trade and Production Database collects production and trade information for 
67 developing and developed countries from different sources and merges them into a 
common classification. The main sources for production data are the UNIDO and OECD 
joint collection program. We obtained from this database value added in current dollars 
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and fixed capital formation, as well as wages and salaries and the number of employees 
for 28 three digit manufacturing industries. Depending on the country, the coverage of 
data is from the late ‘70s to late ‘90s. Value added in current dollars is deflated to obtain 
value added in constant dollars using price deflators from the OECD STAN database.10 
Wages in current dollars were deflated using the same price deflators from the OECD 
STAN database to obtain wages in constant dollars. The real wage utilized in the 
regressions was constructed as wages and salaries in constant dollars over the number of 
employees. 
The Database of Investment and Capital for Agriculture and Manufacturing 
reports the total capital stock for the manufacturing sector. Using capital formation data 
for 28 manufacturing industries from the Trade and Production Database, we also 
obtained total manufacturing sector investment. We then obtained each industry’s share 
of total manufacturing for each country. Finally, we assume that the share of investment 
in the industry in total manufacturing for a specific year is equal to its share of the capital 
stock and then use observed industry share and total manufacturing capital stock to 
calculate capital stock for each manufacturing industry. The data appendix provides 
additional details on the construction of the capital stock. 
With the data at hand and, following Harrigan (1997), under the assumption of a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, total factor productivity (TFP) between countries j 
                                               
10
 We obtain volumes expressed in US dollars as ( )95* /100USvol VALUK VALU= , where VALUK is 
the volume index for value added, and VALUE95 is the base year figure for the current price variable. We 
then obtain the value added deflator as / USVALU vol . Since 1990 is the base tear for the capital stock of 
the manufacturing sector, we use the value added deflator for 1990. 
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and k for industry h can be described as 
( )( ) ( )1/ / /s shjk hj hk hk hj hk hjTFP Y Y L L K K −=             (2.2) 
where Y denotes real value added, L is the number of employees, K is the capital stock 
for each industry and s is the average share of labor in total cost between j and k. In 
calculating TFP, we use three-year averages of the variables using the two preceding 
years along with each cross-section’s sampling year. The data for constructing TFP is not 
available to us for 1975 and is only available for five of the above countries in 1980 
limiting our ability to identify the source country. This is the reason we initially utilize 
price data for 1985 and 1990 for which TFP is available for an identical sample of eight 
countries: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and the United 
Kingdom (UK). Moreover, throughout the paper, we consider manufacturing goods 
prices since we could not obtain the data for constructing TFP for services at a 
disaggregate level and because we are primarily interested in trade costs faced by traded 
goods.11 The availability of the TFP measure across industries is reported in table A1 in 
the data appendix. 
 We utilize bilateral trade flows from the OECD International Trade by 
Commodity Statistics (ITCS) database, in order to identify the probability-weighted 
source for each good sold in each country of the Eurostat price dataset. We are now able 
to use the full sample of countries and years allowed by the CTZ price data, with the 
exception of Luxembourg, as the data requirements of TFP construction no longer 
                                               
11
 Arbitrage models as in Lee (2004) show that price differences across countries will equal the trade costs 
for products that are traded while endowment or productivity differences will determine the exact degree of 
deviations from the LOP for products that are not traded in equilibrium. 
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constrain us. Utilizing this broader sample of countries is desirable since it also enhances 
our ability to assess the probable source for each product among a broader group of 
possible source countries. 
 The ITCS database includes annual bilateral flows in current $US between 269 
international locations for 2581 goods categories for the period 1960-2000. We inspected 
this list of traded goods and categories and came up with a list of 68 product categories 
chosen to best relate to the products from the Eurostat price data. These 68 categories 
which are described in the first column of the table A2 in the appendix, were then 
aggregated by ISIC code into 42 separate four-digit categories of the manufacturing 
sector, shown in the second column of Table A2, that are finally mapped onto the 
disaggregated product prices from the Eurostat data.12 We end up with imports for each 
of 42 industries of each country in our sample from each other.13 That is, we consider 
imports of country j from each other countries in our Eurostat price data for each industry 
h. for each importer j and industry h, the probability-weighted source price for a specific 
product is defined as the weighted average of the prices of exporters of that product with 
weights calculated using bilateral trade flows for each cross-section. 
                                               
12
 There is a many-to-one mapping from goods for which we have prices to the four-digit categories in the 
trade data. Ideally, future work should focus on more disaggregated trade data that can be closely matched 
to the products in the price surveys. However, this labor intensive task would face two inherent problems. 
First, for disaggregated products, the problem of “empty cells” is a greater concern. Second, the 
measurement error is greater for highly disaggregated product categories relative to aggregates. 
 
13
 As we are constrained by the number of countries for which we have price data, we actually use eight 
countries for 1985, 11 for 1980, and 12 for 1985 and 1990. we note that, while in the price data, Belgium 
and Luxembourg prices are given separately, the bilateral flows dataset includes the aggregate of  Belgium 
and Luxembourg reducing the number of countries we can consider by one for each cross-sections. 
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 Denoting hjktim as imports of country j from country k for industry h in cross-
section t, the weight of exporter country k for importer j in industry h is defined 
as
1
1
/ nh h hjkt jkt jktkw im im
−
=
=
∑
, where n is the number of countries in the sample. However 
some exporting countries have missing prices for some goods so that the sum of the 
above weights would not add up to one in these cases. To cope with this, we re-scale the 
weights.14 The price in the probability-weighted origin is then simply given by the 
weighted sum of exporting countries’ observed prices: 
1
1
_ *
nh h h
j t jkt ktkp w new pκ
−
=
=
∑
                                     (2.3) 
where we have one probability-weighted source, κ , for each importer j in each industry 
h. We can then compare the price of each product sold in the importing location relative 
to this probability-weighted source. The same weights are used in order to construct the 
real GDP per capita, the real wage rate, population and distance variables of the 
probability-weighted origin relative to which we compare the respective variables of the 
importing country. 
 Finally, we add the effect of domestic production of the importer country into the 
analysis. Domestically consumed production of country i for industry h is defined as the 
difference between total output and exports of country i for that industry. Total output 
and exports data were obtained from the Trade and Production Database as the three-digit 
level of the manufacturing sector. We treat domestically consumed production for 
country j for industry h in cross-section t as an import from itself and re-define the weight 
                                               
14
 For each good, we consider only imports from countries for which the price is observed so that the new 
weights are given by multiplying hjktw  by 
1
1
n h
jktk im
−
=
∑
over the new imports sum.  
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of exporter country k for importer j in industry h as 
1
/ nh h hjkt jkt jktkw im im== ∑ , where n is the 
number of countries in sample including the importer country j itself. We then re-scale 
the weights as explained in the previous paragraph. The price in the probability-weighted 
origin is again given by the weighted sum of exporting countries’ prices: 
1
_ *
nh h h
j t jkt ktkp w new pκ ==∑ , where the price of the importing country itself is now 
included in this calculation. Again, real GDP per capita, the real wage rate, population, 
and distance for the probabilistic exporter are calculated by using these same weights. 
These weighted variables are then used to construct log differences relative to the 
importing country. To facilitate the construction of relative distance, distance from the 
importing country is defined as ( )1/ 2/jj jdist A π=  where jA  is the surface area of 
importer country j in squared kilometers. 
2.3 Motivation and Estimation 
2.3.1 Theoretical Motivation 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) propose the use of actual price data across 
locations at a point in time as promising route of extracting information about trade cost 
levels. They consider a framework where the price of final good is determined by 
production costs, trade costs, markup, and taxes. Abstracting from markups and taxes 
they are able to impose arbitrage constraints and derive an inequality that constraints 
international relative prices. The assumption here is that if country i buys from countryκ , 
then i ip cκ κτ= , where cκ  is the cost of production inκ , and iκτ  is the trade cost of 
transporting the good from κ  to i. Moreover, country i will buy from κ  if icκ κτ  is the 
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lowest among all potential sources. The inequality thus derived is j ji i
i i j j
z izz iz i
z jz j z jz
cc p
c p c
ττ
τ τ
≤ ≤  
or ji
i j
iziz i
jz j jz
p
p
ττ
τ τ
≤ ≤ , where ip  and jp  are retail prices in country i and j, and iz  and  jz  are 
the optimal sources for country i and j respectively.  When countries i and j purchase the 
good from the same source,κ , then the above inequality is reduced to i i
j j
p
p
κ
κ
τ
τ
= , with the 
relative price now tied down by trade barriers. Finally, they conclude that “in the specific 
case where κ  is one of the two countries, the relative price captures exactly what we 
intend to measure.” That is, once we identify the probable source country then we can 
capture the exact level of trade costs.15 
This treatment is in line with what we do in this paper. Specifically, we use 
independent information on the productivity of each country in each industry to identify 
the most likely source for each product. Utilizing productivity to identify the source is 
consistent with the above framework where a country buys from the cheapest source, and 
with the models of Eaton and Kortum (2001), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Bernard, 
Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), where the most productive country for any one 
product is the sole source of that product. Alternatively, we consider actual trade flows to 
construct the price in the source,κ , as a weighted average of each country’s within-
sample trading partners.  
                                               
15
 Given the absence of product-specific source information, our aim is necessarily less ambitious. We 
estimate an improved measure of the relative importance of two components of broadly defined trade costs: 
transport costs and distribution costs, while controlling for other potential determinants of international 
relative prices. 
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Under the maintained assumptions above, the relative price thus obtained could be 
attributed to trade costs. However, controlling for a number of additional potentially 
important determinants of international price differences is necessary in practice if we are 
to best isolate the impact of trade costs. Our point of departure is the framework outlined 
in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), where final good prices might differ 
internationally to the extent that transport costs, and local trade costs, taxes, and markups 
exhibit variation across countries and goods.  
Given the absence of direct measures of transportation costs for broad cross-
sections of goods and countries and the problems associated with cif/fob ratios in levels 
as discussed in Hummels and Lugovskyy (2003), we follow the usual practice of using 
physical distance between the capital cities of the countries in our sample to capture 
transportation costs. That is, once we identify the probable source for each product, we 
identify the size of transport costs by estimated coefficient of distance from the source 
country. In addition, as suggested in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), we allow for 
industry-specific differences in transport costs, first through a measure of tradeability16 as 
in CTZ and following that, through the use of industry-specific distance interaction 
effects. 
We also account for the presence of local distribution costs through income per 
capita differences and by considering industry-specific features of these local costs as 
                                               
16
 Since this industry-specific measure is based on realized trade flows, it might partly capture industry-
specific trade costs other than transport cost. Moreover, industry-specific measures can only be considered 
as determinants of absolute price deviations, since actual price deviations are related to the direction of 
trade across countries and can only be explained by factors that have variation across countries. 
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captured by the non-traded factor input content of each good.17 Industry-specific features 
of local costs are also captured by domestic real wage rate rates. Differences in taxes 
across goods are captured by group-specific dummies for classes of goods that are likely 
to face higher taxes and where broadly available, by VAT differences across goods and 
countries. 
Finally, we assume that larger markets are more competitive so that demand 
elasticities are higher and markups lower there, and use population size to capture market 
size. Larger markets are likely to have a greater number of exporters serving them –in the 
presence of some fixed cost component in trade cost- and are also more likely to have 
domestic production of close substitutes for imports –in the presence of some fixed cost 
component to production inducing economies of scale-both factors leading to a more 
elastic perceived demand for imports and lower prices in larger markets. It might also be 
that potentially price discriminating exporters’ value large foreign markets more than 
smaller ones thus exhibiting greater risk aversion for losing large markets and are less 
likely to charge higher prices there in the presence of demand uncertainty. On the other 
hand, population size might capture scale economies that simply lower the average 
domestic cost of production leading to lower domestic prices. However, the scale of 
domestic production also depends on exports so that population size is less likely to 
capture scale economies from the production side and more likely to capture scale 
economies in the domestic distribution or retail sector. In any case, given the difficulty of 
capturing variations in markups across countries, an alternative starting assumption 
                                               
17
 We fallow Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) in classifying transport costs and distribution costs as two 
categories of trade costs, the second of which is related to the local cost component of final prices. 
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would be that markups exist but are similar across countries so that they do not impact on 
international price differences. This assumption is imposed in Crucini, Telmer and 
Zachariadis (2004) and discussed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). In that case, the 
coefficients of population size differences would be interpreted instead as measures of 
scale economies across industries and specific to countries. 
2.3.2 Estimation and Results 
Based on the above, we expect that the price difference between the importing 
location and the source country for a particular final product would be largely determined 
by transport costs and international differences in local distribution costs, taxes and 
markups. Thus, we attempt to infer the estimates of the impact of each potential 
determinant of international price differences by utilizing physical distance as a measure 
of the importance of transport costs, income per capita or domestic industry-specific real 
wage rates as measures of the local cost component comprising the price of final goods, 
and population size as capturing differences in markups, also allowing where possible for 
VAT differences across industries and countries. In addition, for the absolute price 
differences specifications we are able to consider product category-specific differences in 
taxes and industry-specific measures of tradeability and the non-traded factor input 
content to capture the importance of industry-specific  transport costs and local 
distribution costs respectively. 
2.3.2.1 All Unique Bilateral Comparisons 
As a first step, we consider the following regression equation for all possible 
unique bilateral price comparisons j-k 
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0 1 2 3ijk jk jk jk ijkq Dist y Popα α α α ε= + + + +                (2.4) 
where ijkq  is the log deviation from the Law-of-One-Price (LOP) for good i between 
countries j and k, 0α  is a constant term18, and ijkε  is a random error19. jkDist  is the (log) 
distance separating the capital cities of the two countries and is meant as a proxy for 
transportation costs impeding trade and maintaining price differentials across j and k.  
The variable jky  is the log difference in real GDP per capita between j and k and captures 
the local cost component suggested by the theoretical framework from CTZ and 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). That is, GDP per capita captures a “wage effect” 
whereby richer countries will have higher non-traded sector labor costs.20 In this sense, 
GDP per capita is a measure of the local distribution costs discussed above. Finally, 
jkPop  is the log difference in population size in 000’s between countries j and k and is 
meant to capture the effect of domestic market size. The inclusion of population size is 
also consistent with gravity models used to assess international quantity flows. 
 In considering all possible unique bilateral comparisons j-k, we compare each pair 
of countries once with each bilateral comparison made based on alphabetical order rather 
than relative to countries more likely to be a source for the product. This is then an 
                                               
18
 All explanatory variables are demeaned so that the constant can be interpreted as the price deviation 
relative to source k at average levels of distance, real GDP per capita, and population size in the sample. 
 
19
 As shown in Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2000), it is necessary to correct the standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity in this specific context, where we use the aggregative values of the explanatory variables 
to explain a highly disaggregated dependent variable. This creates a heteroskedastic pattern in the variance 
of the regression term as shown in the earlier paper. This type of aggregation also makes goodness of fit 
measures difficult to interpret, so that the low R2’s reported here should be taken with caution. 
 
20
 Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2004) explore the relation between distribution costs and GDP per 
capita. 
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arbitrary comparison using no information regarding the source of each product and 
renders the coefficient of geographic distance proxying for transport cost meaningless. 
This case will be a reference point with which to compare trade cost estimates obtained 
utilizing information on the probable source of each product. 
 Estimates and t-statistics from estimating the above specification (Model 1) with 
OLS and correcting standard errors for the inherent heteroskedasticity are presented in 
Table 2.1. The distance coefficient is estimated to be negative and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero for 1985 and equal to 5.5 percent and significant in 1990. 
Considering all possible bilateral comparisons tends to average out around zero the 
impact of transportation costs on prices producing unreliable estimates. The estimated 
coefficient of distance is perhaps devoid of meaning here as distance between two 
arbitrary countries does not necessarily capture distance between exporter and importer. 
If trade between two countries does not occur for that product, then that price difference 
will lie between the no-arbitrage bounds and will be less than the trade costs.  Moreover, 
when comparing two countries it is possible that both export some of the same products 
to each other. To the extent that this is the case, the final price for these products will 
incorporate a similar transportation costs in both countries so that there might be a little 
or no impact of transportation costs on the price difference for these products between the 
two countries.21 In general, in the absence of some information regarding the source of 
                                               
21
 It is also possible that k is the main exporter to j for some product i and does not import this product from 
j, and j is the main exporter to k for some product i’ and does not import this product from k. In that case, 
this would induce the distance coefficient to be positive as transport costs increase the price in country j 
relative to k while in the second case the distance coefficient would be negative. The overall result is a 
possible washing out of the average effect of transport costs across goods. This is related to the “averaging-
out” property discussed in Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2004) and can be addressed by considering 
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each product and the direction of trade, the distance coefficient will not capture transport 
costs well in the context of “directional regressions” such as the one in Model 1. 
 GDP per-capita and population enter in expected ways in Model 1. Per -capita 
GDP shows a strong positive relation with price differences between countries. The price 
elasticity of real GDP per-capita is 29.5 percent for 1985, and 28.3 percent for 1990, 
exhibiting remarkable stability over this five year period. Moreover, higher population is 
associated with lower prices in a country suggesting a potential role for markup 
differences across countries due to differences in demand elasticities that are positively 
related to the market size. In this case, the markup would be lower in larger markets as 
evident in the negative estimated coefficients for population size. Alternatively, scale 
economies in distribution related to the domestic size of the market might be behind this 
finding. 
 Model 2 describes the relation between absolute price differences and the absolute 
values of the variables that are included in Model 1 as well as additional industry-specific 
variables like tradeability and local factor input content of goods in each industry. Taking 
absolute values of the price differences serves three purposes. First, it allows us to use 
distance as a meaningful determinant of (absolute) price dispersion even in the absence of 
source country information. This is the case since it resolves the “averaging-out” 
problem, as pointed out by Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2004). Secondly, it allows 
us to consider the two industry-specific variables from CTZ which are closely related to a 
theoretical model where final goods are produced by combining local inputs with traded 
                                                                                                                                            
absolute price differences for each product across countries or an appropriate variance measure. We pursue 
this in Model 2 below.  
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inputs. We would expect goods characterized by a higher degree of tradeability to have 
smaller absolute price dispersion, and goods with higher local input content to have a 
higher degree of absolute price dispersion. In our empirical specification, these industry-
specific variables enter along with the country-specific measures of transport costs and 
local distribution costs, where separate impact of industry and country-specific factors 
would suggest that these trade exhibit heterogeneity across both industries and countries. 
Finally, we can now introduce two dummy variables related to characteristics of 
categories of goods. These are intended to control for the degree of tax differences 
present for certain products where we have some a priori evidence (but no good-specific 
data) regarding particularly high differences across countries. We would expect such 
goods to be characterized by a higher degree of absolute price dispersion. 
 Thus, we estimate the following regression equation for Model 2: 
0 1 2 3 4ijk jk jk jk h ijkq Dist y Pop Xα α α α α ε= + + + + +          (2.5) 
where hX  is a vector of industry-specific and category-specific variables capturing 
product characteristics as described above. The remaining variables are defined as in 
regression equation 2.3. The constant  0α  now captures price dispersion at mean 
distance, real GDP per capita and population size in the sample. The results for Model 2 
indicate that as distance between countries increases so does absolute price dispersion. 
For example, based on the 1985 estimates, doubling in distance increases absolute price 
dispersion by 10 percent. We also see that price differences are lower for goods that 
belong to more highly tradeable industries. To the extent that more tradeable goods face 
determining absolute price dispersion. Thus, both bilateral distance and industry specific 
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Table 2.1 All Unique Bilateral Comparisons With GDP per-capita 
 
 
 
 
        Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10. In Model 2 we take absolute values for all         
variables. In Model 3 we use the mean of absolute LOP deviations. The eight countries considered here are: 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and the UK. 
 
 
lower effective transportation costs this result suggest a role for transport costs in aspects 
of transport costs (tradeability) matter –about equally- for absolute price dispersion. 
Furthermore, higher local input share implies higher absolute price dispersion as the 
model discussed earlier would predict. Moreover, income per-capita differences enter as 
a positive determinant of price dispersion, suggesting that both country specific and 
 1985 1990 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Population -.066* (-22.54) 
.006** 
(1.96) 
.003 
(0.29) 
-.049* 
(-17.14) 
.007** 
(2.51) 
.011 
(1.34) 
GDP per-capita .295* (19.02) 
.036** 
(2.46) 
.036 
(0.76) 
.283* 
(17.20) 
.047* 
(2.91) 
.132** 
(2.60) 
Distance -.009 (-0.98) 
.100* 
(15.79) 
.116* 
(5.69) 
.055* 
(6.40) 
.075* 
(11.97) 
.095* 
(4.58) 
Tradability  -.057* (-7.24) 
-.089* 
(-5.36)  
-.087* 
(-11.46) 
-.076* 
(-4.22) 
Non-traded input share  .010* (9.12) 
.011* 
(3.94)  
.003* 
(2.63) 
.007* 
(2.66) 
Large cars  .255* (6.95)   
.143* 
(7.67)  
Vices  .227* (13.51) 
.172* 
(4.99)  
.218* 
(12.83) 
.194* 
(5.69) 
Constant .076* (18.65) 
.274* 
(21.78) 
.311* 
(8.93) 
.097* 
(24.00) 
.359* 
(29.29) 
.314* 
(8.54) 
R2(in percentage) 4.1 5.8 16.9 3.5 6.3 23.2 
Observations 13995 13995 530 12315 12315 473 
Countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 
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industry specific aspects of distribution costs matter for absolute price dispersion. 
However, the estimated impact of income on absolute relative prices across countries in 
many times smaller than its impact on the actual level of relative prices. By considering 
absolute price differences we might be underestimating the importance of the local cost 
component in determining price levels. In this case, the gains made in terms of estimating 
the transport cost component of trade costs using absolute price dispersion in Model 2 
would appear to be a loss in terms of our ability to estimate the distribution costs 
component of trade costs. 
 Finally, population coefficient estimates suggest absolute price dispersion 
increases with differences in population size, indicating a possible role for markup 
differences as determinants of international price dispersion. The dummies for large cars 
and vices also have positive and significant effects on absolute price deviations. If a good 
belongs to the classified by one of these dummies, its price difference between countries 
will be larger, suggesting a role for tax differences in determining international price 
dispersion. 
 For Models 1 and 2, goodness-of-fit measures (R2) are very low. Price data are 
more disaggregated than explanatory variables; therefore the R2 is not meaningful for 
these models. As explained in CTZ, this type of aggregation makes goodness-of-fit 
measures difficult to interpret s that the low R2 here reported here should be taken with 
caution. In order to alleviate the problem, we follow CTZ and aggregate the data. 
Specifically we use mean absolute price differences for each bilateral pair of countries in 
each three-digit industry and then run Model 2 again on the same explanatory variables as 
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before. This is Model 3 for which results are reported in Table 2.1.  The goodness-of-fit 
increases substantially for both cross sections. The coefficient estimates for most of the 
variables are similar qualitatively to those reported for Model 2. The estimated 
coefficient for the distance is positive and significant in both cross sections for Model 3 
as was the case in Model 2, while the estimated coefficients for local costs are generally 
higher than in Model 2. The estimated coefficient for category-specific taxes is about the 
same as in Model 2 in the case of vices. However, since in Model 3 we aggregate 
according to 3 digit ISIC category, the dummy for “large cars” has not been included in 
this regression since this product category is one of several in category 384 which 
includes all transport equipment;. 
 As a robustness check and to account for broader local costs (including 
production costs), we re-estimate Models 1, 2 and 3 utilizing information on industry-
level real wage rates across countries. Since countries with higher GDP per-capita will 
typically have higher wage rates, we do not include both measures to avoid the inherent 
collinearity problem for these two variables. Industry-level real wage rates capture the 
local cost component attributed to labor but specific to each industry. The fact that our 
wage measure captures variation across both industries and countries is an advantage 
relative to country specific measures of real GDP per-capita.  The exercise also offers a 
robustness check for our coefficient estimates on distance, tradeability, and industry-
specific local input costs. We report results utilizing wage rates in Table 2.2. We can see 
that real wage rate has positive impact on price differences in Model 1, and on absolute 
price differences on Models 2 and 3. The wage impact on prices is about half the GDP 
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impact for Model 1 but larger than the GDP impact for Model 2 and more robust than the 
GDP impact for Model 3. We also see that the coefficient estimates for the industry 
specific measures of tradeability and the local factor input content are virtually 
unchanged. Finally, the estimates for the distance coefficient are qualitatively similar but 
smaller across the board for all three models and both years relative to the specifications 
that include GDP per-capita in Table 2.1. This might suggest that real wage rates capture 
an aspect of local production costs that would otherwise be in part attributed to transport 
costs. 
2.3.2.2 Utilizing Information on Relative Productivity 
 Overall the results for models 2 and 3 summarized in Table 2.1 indicate that there 
is a positive and significant relation between distance and absolute price dispersion. 
However, the interpretation of the coefficients related to transport costs can be 
problematic for the reasons outlined in the previous section and in the introduction. 
Moreover, as shown in Table 2.1 for Model 1, the effect of distance on price differences 
is estimated to be statistically indistinguishable from zero for 1985 for instance, perhaps 
pointing to the argument put forth by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). That is, without 
knowing the potential source for a good, we can not estimate the precise role of 
transportation costs in determining differences in the price levels for that good between 
countries.22   
One way to address the problem is to assume that the more productive among any  
                                               
22
 One approach would be just assuming one of the countries to be the main exporter using a-priori 
information. This is unsatisfactory conceptually for obvious reasons and, as one would expect, this 
approach does not give reliable results. Table in the appendix reports the estimation results for Germany 
and the U.K.  used as a reference countries in each case. The sign and the significance of the distance 
coefficients are not robust across periods or reference countries. 
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Table 2.2 All Unique Bilateral Comparisons With Real Wage Rate 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10. In Model 2 we take absolute values for all 
variables. In Model 3 we use the mean of absolute LOP deviations. The eight countries considered here are: 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and the UK. 
 
two countries being compared will export the good to the other country.23 A problem 
with this approach would be that given the measurement error associated with TFP 
construction, comparing countries with similar productivity is likely to often give the  
                                               
23
 Thus one could consider adding to Model 1 an interaction term between the inverse of the productivity 
differences and distance across any two countries. This would capture the idea that for each bilateral 
comparison, the less productive country will be importing product from the more productive country and 
thus have higher prices than the latter country according to the extent of transportation costs present. 
 
 
1985 1990 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Population -.043* (-16.39) 
.007** 
(2.50) 
.005 
(0.58) 
-.041* 
(-15.58) 
.009* 
(3.39) 
.015*** 
(1.91) 
Real Wage Rate .098* (13.14) 
.055* 
(7.49) 
.082* 
(3.78) 
.148* 
(20.05) 
.061* 
(7.41) 
.106* 
(4.50) 
Distance -.005 (-0.54) 
.075* 
(11.10) 
.075* 
(3.52) 
.035* 
(4.04) 
.056* 
(8.76) 
.068* 
(3.28) 
Tradability  -.058* (-7.39) 
-.092* 
(-5.75)  
-.088* 
(-11.62) 
-.077* 
(-4.28) 
Non-traded input share  .010* (9.14) 
.010* 
(4.07)  
.003* 
(2.73) 
.007* 
(2.72) 
Large cars  .259* (7.00)   
.150* 
(8.07)  
Vices  .224* (13.39) 
.167* 
(4.94)  
.219* 
(12.97) 
.196* 
(5.86) 
Constant .076* (18.53) 
.274* 
(21.91) 
.318* 
(9.38) 
.098* 
(24.25) 
.358* 
(29.32) 
.314* 
(8.78) 
R2(in percentage) 2.9 6.2 19.1 4.6 6.8 25.6 
Observations 13995 13995 530 12315 12315 473 
Countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 
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wrong ordering, simply because of measurement error. A related and preferable method 
is to consider price comparisons only relative to the most productive country in the data, 
to avoid an ordering based on comparisons among countries that are closer together in 
terms of productivity. 
 Thus, we first rank countries according to their productivity in each industry and 
then denote the most productive country to be the source or reference country for that 
specific industry. Under the assumption that the most productive country for a certain 
industry will be the main exporter of goods of that industry, we can then construct the 
good-specific log relative prices between each country j relative to the main exporter 
country κ  for each industry h. 
 Admittedly, this approach does not fully resolve the problem of identifying the 
source country for each good in our price sample since our measure of productivity is at 
the three-digit level and suffers from an obvious aggregation bias.  Moreover, for each 
destination country there might be more than one main exporter of goods in a certain 
industry and this exporter might or might not be among the countries in our sample. We 
begin to address the problems in the next section where we use bilateral imports among 
the countries in our sample to obtain the probability that a good sold in a certain location 
was imported from any of the countries in the sample, and by making use of the share of 
imports from non-EU countries to restrict the sample to goods that are more likely to be 
imported from the EU countries in our sample. However, as we show next, the current 
                                                                                                                                            
Implementing this, we obtain consistently positive but small estimated coefficients for this measure, with 
relatively large standard errors. 
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methodology goes some distance into identifying the source country and thus providing a 
meaningful measure of transport costs. 
 Before turning to estimation using price differences relative to the most 
productive country, we attempt to evaluate the hypothesis that the productivity is 
inversely related to prices, consistent with productivity being a determinant of the 
direction of trade. We consider a specification similar to (2.3) adding now a term for 
productivity differences across countries: 
1985: 
( )
[ ]
( )
[ ]
( )
[ ]
( )
[ ]
( )
[ ]
0.90 19.56 * 3.48 *18.60 * 23.02 *
0 31 2 4
.008 .318 .035.076 .068
ijk jk jk jk hjk ijkq D ist y Pop TF P εα αα α α
− −−
= + + + + +
− −−
    
1990: 
( )
[ ]
( )
[ ]
( )
[ ]
( )
[ ]
( )
[ ]
6 .63 * 17.78 * 4.40 *6 .49 * 17 .84 *
0 31 2 4
.057 .325 .042.098 .051
ijk jk jk jk h jk ijkq D ist y Pop TFP εα αα α α
−−
= + + + + +
−−
 
hjkTFP  is the difference in total factor productivity across countries j and k for industry h, 
where industry h is a three digit classification with a one-to-many mapping into 
individual goods i. Above, we report the estimates and t-statistics for the variables in the 
regression for 1985 and 1990. The estimates for TFP suggest a negative impact on prices. 
These estimates suggest the relevance of productivity in determining the direction of 
international trade and as a result international price differences. The negative impact of 
TFP is also consistent with the theoretical model of Benigno and Thoenissen (2003) and 
parameterizations of the model in Bergin, Glick and Taylor (forthcoming). 
 Given that TFP is a determinant of the direction of price differences across 
countries, we now go ahead to consider the following regression equation: 
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0 1 2 3ijk j j j ijq Dist y Popκ κ κ κα α α α ε= + + + +          (2.6) 
where ijq κ  is the log deviation from the Law-of-One-Price (LOP) for good i between 
countries j andκ , the most productive country in industry h assumed to be the main 
source for product i in country j. To estimate equation (2.6) we utilize the industry-
specific country ranking implied by cross-sectional TFP levels in constructing the 
dependent variable of prices relative to the most productive location. Again, jPop κ  and 
jy κ  are the population and real GDP per-capita log differences between countries j and 
κ  respectively, jDist κ  denotes the log distance between source κ  and destination j, and 
ijkε  is a random error. As the explanatory variables demeaned, the constant 0α  captures 
the price deviation relative to source κ  at average levels of distance, real GDP per-
capita, and population size in the sample. Regression equation (2.6) incorporates 
information regarding the direction of trade and can thus assist in inferring the overall 
level of trade costs and the level of transport costs component of trade costs as the 
estimated coefficient for physical distance. Results from this estimation framework are 
summarized in Table 2.3. 
 Model 1, the first specification of Table 2.3, indicates that distance has a positive 
and significant impact on international price differences, suggesting a role for 
transportation costs as a determinant of these. Based on the 1990 estimates, a doubling in 
distance would lead to an increase in prices of 9 percent, substantially greater than the 5.5 
percent increase for the specification with all unique bilateral price comparisons in Table 
2.1. The improvement in terms of the estimated distance coefficient is even more striking 
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for 1985. Comparing Model 1 across Tables 2.1 and 2.3, we see that the estimated 
coefficient of distance changes sign becoming positive and strongly significant once we 
account for the probable source of the traded products. When the most productive country 
for each industry is chosen as the reference location, distance consistently has a positive 
and significant effect on relative price levels. As the distance between source and 
destination country increases, transportation costs go up and so does the price of the good 
in the destination country. We conclude that our approach goes some distance in 
capturing the likely source country for each industry, even if the existence of multiple 
products within any industry creates aggregation bias that might still wash out the impact 
of distance and transport costs to a considerable degree. In addition, local costs are 
captured by real GDP per-capita appear to have a strong effect on price differences with 
elasticities equal to 28 percent for 1985 and 42 percent for 1990. Moreover, according to 
our estimate of the constant term, the importing country typically had prices which were 
4.7 percent higher than the source at mean levels of the explanatory variables in 1990. 
Finally, population size has a negative effect on price differences with an estimated price 
elasticity of minus 5.6 percent in 1985 and minus 5 percent in 1990. This would suggest 
that markups are about 5 percent lower in larger countries. 
Next, we utilize absolute law-of-one-price deviations relative to the most 
productive country to estimate a specification similar to (2.5) this formulation allows us 
to consider the impact of good-specific variables that are common across countries and 
which help explain overall price dispersion. Specifically, we consider tradeability and the 
non-traded factor component of goods as Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2004). 
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Table 2.3 Price Differentials Relative to Most Productive Country for Each Industry 
(with GDP per-capita) 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10. In Model 2 we take absolute values for all 
variables. In Model 3 we use the mean of absolute LOP deviations. The eight countries considered here are: 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and the UK. 
 
 
This also allows aggregation into mean absolute price differences (Model 3) 
which allows us to obtain more meaningful measures of the goodness-of-fit. We plot the 
bivariate relation between mean absolute price differences and distance for 1985 and 
1990 in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 respectively. The visual evidence supports a positive 
relation between these two variables. 
 
 
1985 1990 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Population -.056* (-13.91) 
-.001 
(-0.28) 
.015 
(1.27) 
-.050* 
(-11.14) 
-.010*** 
(-1.90) 
-.0003 
(-0.02) 
GDP per-capita .280* (11.84) 
.027 
(1.05) 
-.104 
(-1.20) 
.422* 
(12.33) 
-.048 
(-1.18) 
-.009 
(-0.08) 
Distance .041* (2.98) 
.100* 
(10.00) 
.130* 
(3.94) 
.090* 
(6.61) 
.064* 
(6.13) 
.093** 
(2.08) 
Tradability  -.046* (-3.04) 
-.063** 
(-2.13)  
-.061* 
(-3.86) 
-.034 
(-0.93) 
Non-traded input share  .010* (4.74) 
.005 
(1.14)  
.008* 
(3.49) 
.006 
(1.47) 
Large cars  .147* (2.70)   
.084* 
(2.97)  
Vices  .162* (5.99) 
.089** 
(2.19)  
.187* 
(5.96) 
.151* 
(2.88) 
Constant .016** (2.25) 
.228* 
(9.83) 
.311* 
(5.87) 
.047* 
(6.54) 
.255* 
(10.85) 
.290* 
(4.92) 
R2(in percentage) 5.4 5.7 17.6 4.8 5.0 15.7 
Observations 3373 3373 132 3186 3186 123 
Countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 
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The estimates for Models 2 and 3 are reported in Table 2.3. The distance 
coefficient always has a positive significant impact on absolute price differences.  
However, for Models 2 and 3 there appears to be little gain in terms of the effect 
of distance on absolute price differences relative to the estimates utilizing all unique 
 
Figure 2.1  Most Productive Country Comparison-1985  
bilateral price comparisons reported in Table 2.1. This is in contrast to the significant 
gains achieved when we utilize the productivity information to identify the source in 
Model 1. 
Accounting for industry-specific productivity resolves some of the problems 
associated with the lack of information on the source of each product, so that considering 
absolute price deviations in Models 2 and 3 does not have as much of an additional 
impact on the distance coefficient in addition to the gains achieved in Model 1. The 
0 
.2 
.4 
.6 
.8 
1 
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remaining parameter estimates are for the most part similar to those for the Models 2 and 
3 in Table 2.1, with the exception of population which is now estimated to have a small 
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Figure 2.2  Most Productive Country Comparison-1990 
negative impact on absolute price dispersion in Model 2 for 1990, and GDP per-capita 
that is now statistically indistinguishable from zero for both models and both cross-
sections. The latter finding suggests that once we consider comparisons relative to the 
most productive country, higher income differences are no longer associated with higher 
price dispersion. That is, while richer countries tend to have substantially higher prices as 
shown in Model 1, it is not the case that absolute price dispersion increases as the income 
gap across two countries become wider.24 
                                               
24
 The small sample of relatively similar income countries considered here and the resulting small variation 
in income for these data might be the reason behind the latter finding. 
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Finally, the constant 0α  captures the price dispersion relative to the source with 
average levels of distance, real GDP per-capita, and population size in the sample. This is 
equal to 31 percent in 1985 and 29 percent in 1990. 
In Table 2.4, we re-estimate Models 1, 2, and 3 replacing GDP per-capita by wage 
rates that vary both across industries and countries. In Model 1, wage differences are 
positively associated with price differences with price elasticities of 15 percent for 1985 
and 20.9 percent for 1990. Moreover, according to the estimate of the constant term in 
Model 1, the importing country typically had prices were 4.8 percent higher than the 
source at mean levels of the explanatory variables in 1990. The estimated coefficient for 
distance is now bigger than the coefficients estimated when GDP per-capita is included 
instead of wage rates. 
The distance coefficient is now estimated to be 10 percent for 1990 and 7 percent 
for 1985, compared to 9 percent and 4 percent respectively in the estimations presented in 
Table 2.3 utilizing GDP per-capita. Comparing these estimates of distance with the ones 
obtained using all unique bilateral comparisons in Table 2.2, we see that these are now 
considerably larger. For 1990, the distance coefficient point estimate was equal to 3.5 
percent while for 1985 this was negative and statistically indistinguishable than zero. The 
improvement in terms of estimating the distance coefficient using the most productive 
country comparisons is thus even more pronounced when we include wage rates instead 
of GDP per-capita. Estimates of the variables in Model 2 and 3 in Table 2.4 are 
qualitatively similar to those in Table 2.3. Again the population size coefficient is 
estimated to have the wrong negative sign in Model 2 for 1990. The coefficient estimates 
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for the industry-specific measures of tradeability and local factor input content are 
virtually unchanged relative to those reported in Table 2.3. 
However, for these absolute price comparisons the coefficient estimates for 
distance become smaller relative to the specification with GDP per-capita. Finally, price 
dispersion relative to the source at average levels of distance, real GDP per-capita, and 
population size in the sample is equal to 31.7 percent in 1985, and 27.6 percent in 1990 
for Model 3, almost identical to the estimates of the constant term in Table 2.3 
 Finally, for 1990 for which we have VAT data for all countries in our sample, we 
reconsider Models 1 to 3 for the specification with all bilateral price differences and the 
one relative to the most productive country, adding now VAT log differences as an 
explanatory variable on the RHS. VAT is not observed for Greece, Portugal and Spain 
except in the 1990 sample. For this reason, we do not consider VAT for 1985 since this 
would reduce our small sample to just five countries, and further limit our ability to 
“guess” the probable source and destination countries for each industry.25 We report 
results in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 utilizing GDP per capita and wage rates respectively.  For 
Model 1, the estimated coefficient for VAT differences is positive, very high, and 
strongly significant. The remaining estimates we obtain are for the most part similar to 
those in Tables 2.1 to 2.4. For the specification using all bilateral comparisons, the 
coefficients for Model 1 are virtually unchanged at 5.2 and 3.4 percent relative to 5.5 and 
3.5 percent in the specifications without the VAT variable reported in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 
for the specifications with GDP and wages respectively. However, the estimated distance 
                                               
25
 Ideally, we would like the maximum possible number of countries so that the most productive country in 
our sample will be more likely to be the source in the actual trade data. 
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Table 2.4 Price Differentials Relative to Most Productive Country for Each Industry 
(with Real Wage Rate) 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10. In Model 2 we take absolute values for all 
variables. In Model 3 we use the mean of absolute LOP deviations. The eight countries considered here are: 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and the UK. 
 
coefficient in Model 1 for the specification using price comparisons relative to the most 
productive country now falls to 6.4 percent in Table 2.5 and to 7.7 percent in Table 2.6., 
relative to 9.0 and 10.1 percent in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Although lower than prior to the 
inclusion of VAT differences, these estimates are still higher than those obtained using all 
bilateral comparisons. Finally, for Models 2 and 3, the distance coefficients before and 
after the inclusion of VAT differences are nearly unchanged and so are the coefficient 
 
 
1985 1990 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Population -.031* (-9.05) 
.001 
(0.27) 
.009 
(0.86) 
-.027* 
(-7.46) 
-.012** 
(-2.55) 
-.002 
(-0.15) 
Real Wage Rate .150* (8.31) 
.054* 
(3.71) 
.046 
(1.15) 
.209* 
(12.06) 
.034*** 
(1.66) 
.096*** 
(1.96) 
Distance .070* (4.60) 
.081* 
(7.63) 
.097* 
(2.71) 
.101* 
(7.21) 
.046* 
(3.98) 
.049 
(1.24) 
Tradability  -.051* (-3.36) 
-.073** 
(-2.46)  
-.063* 
(-3.92) 
-.030 
(-0.82) 
Non-traded input share  .010* (4.87) 
.005 
(1.21)  
.008* 
(3.55) 
.007*** 
(1.70) 
Large cars  .152* (2.81)   
.088* 
(3.17)  
Vices  .157* (5.83) 
.088** 
(2.24)  
.186* 
(6.00) 
.151* 
(3.06) 
Constant .014*** (1.87) 
.229* 
(9.86) 
.317* 
(5.95) 
.048* 
(6.68) 
.254* 
(10.78) 
.276* 
(4.78) 
R2(in percentage) 4.3 6.2 17.4 5.3 5.0 17.8 
Observations 3373 3373 132 3186 3186 123 
Countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 
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estimates for tradeability and the local input content, while population size is again 
estimated to have the wrong negative sign for Model 2 in 1990. 
2.3.2.3 Utilizing Trade Flows 
Assuming the most productive country in an industry to be the sole exporter of 
goods of that industry to the countries in our sample does not completely resolve the 
problem of identifying the source. It is possible that a similar product is exported by more 
than one country. To cope with this, we use information about industry-specific bilateral 
trade flows across countries in our sample so as to take into consideration that the same 
type of good can be exported by more than one country within the sample. However, the 
goods could also be imports from countries other than the EU sample we have price data 
for. To the extend that this is the case, our within-sample import weights will not reflect 
the true probability that a good sold in one location is imported from an other location in 
the sample. For instance, in 1990, the share of imports from European Union (EU) 
countries, for our sample is 84 percent for “furniture except metal industries”, but only 51 
percent for “tobacco and tobacco products industries”.Moreover, the import share from 
the EU varies between countries for the same industry.  For example, in 1990 the  share 
of EU imports for France, Italy  and Greece in “tobacco and tobacco products industries” 
is higher than 90 percent, whereas the share for Denmark is 11 percent and for Spain only 
8 percent. This tells us that, for some countries and industries, important exporters are 
outside the EU sample we have price data for. In order to alleviate this problem, we 
consider 50 percent as a cutoff point for the fraction of imports form the EU by each 
county in each industry. 
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Table 2.5 1990 with VAT (with GDP per-capita) 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10. In Model 2 we take absolute values for all 
variables. In Model 3 we use the mean of absolute LOP deviations. The eight countries considered 
here are: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and the UK. 
 
That is, for each importer and industry, the ratio of imports from the EU over total 
imports is constructed and if this is lowers than 50 percent cutoff point, the goods 
belonging to that industry is dropped from the dataset. This approach increases the 
likelihood that a certain good we consider in the price comparisons is actually imported 
 
 
 
All Unique Bilateral Comparisons Most Productive Country 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Population -.029* (-9.01) 
.005*** 
(1.78) 
.010 
(1.17) 
-.034* 
(-6.74) 
-.008 
(-1.52) 
-.003 
(-0.21) 
GDP per-capita .210* (12.37) 
.053* 
(3.31) 
.133* 
(2.63) 
.336* 
(9.47) 
-.062 
(-1.56) 
.002 
(0.01) 
Distance .052* (6.14) 
.074* 
(11.86) 
.095* 
(4.60) 
.064* 
(4.74) 
.062* 
(5.99) 
.091** 
(2.01) 
VAT 1.02* (15.38) 
.440* 
(7.46) 
.173 
(0.80) 
.735* 
(6.44) 
.395* 
(3.77) 
.214 
(0.58) 
Tradability  -.080* (-10.50) 
-.076* 
(-4.17)  
-.052* 
(-3.33) 
-.034 
(-0.92) 
Non-traded input share  .003* (2.71) 
.007* 
(2.64)  
.008* 
(3.48) 
.006 
(1.45) 
Large cars  .127* (6.76)   
.075* 
(2.61)  
Vices  .228* (13.41) 
.195* 
(5.71)  
.200* 
(6.34) 
.153* 
(2.88) 
Constant .099* (24.57) 
.354* 
(28.82) 
.316* 
(8.57) 
.047* 
(6.57) 
.251* 
(10.65) 
.293* 
(4.96) 
R2(in percentage) 5.5 6.8 23.3 6.0 5.4 15.8 
Observations 12315 12315 473 3186 3186 123 
Countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 
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Table 2.6 1990 with VAT (with real wage rate) 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10. In Model 2 we take absolute values for all 
variables. In Model 3 we use the mean of absolute LOP deviations. The eight countries considered 
here are: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and the UK. 
 
form an EU country. The advantage of this approach is that for these goods we can better 
identify the source and thus estimate more precisely transport costs relevant to our 
sample countries.This point onward we proceed to utilize quantity data on bilateral trade 
flows among the countries in our sample in order to determine the direction of trade and 
construct price differences relative to the probable exporter for any one industry. The 
 
 
All Unique Bilateral Comparisons Most Productive Country 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Population -.024* (-8.56) 
.007* 
(2.65) 
.013 
(1.61) 
-.016* 
(-4.10) 
-.010** 
(-2.20) 
-.007 
(-0.54) 
Real Wage Rate .124* (16.56) 
.072* 
(8.63) 
.109* 
(4.67) 
.178* 
(10.09) 
.055** 
(2.54) 
.113** 
(2.14) 
Distance .034* (4.01) 
.052* 
(7.99) 
.067* 
(3.23) 
.077* 
(5.39) 
.035* 
(2.85) 
.042 
(1.02) 
VAT 1.01* (15.72) 
.516* 
(8.64) 
.310 
(1.47) 
.820* 
(7.32) 
.454* 
(4.07) 
.503 
(1.34) 
Tradability  -.080* (-10.53) 
-.077* 
(-4.22)  
-.054* 
(-3.43) 
-.029 
(-0.78) 
Non-traded input share  .003* (2.84) 
.007* 
(2.68)  
.008* 
(3.60) 
.007*** 
(1.72) 
Large cars  .134* (7.10)   
.080* 
(2.86)  
Vices  .232* (13.68) 
.198* 
(5.95)  
.200* 
(6.41) 
.155* 
(3.09) 
Constant .099* (24.83) 
.352* 
(28.80) 
.318* 
(8.83) 
.048* 
(6.70) 
.248* 
(10.50) 
.281* 
(4.88) 
R2(in percentage) 6.7 7.4 25.9 6.9 5.6 18.5 
Observations 12315 12315 473 3186 3186 123 
Countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 
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probability that a country in our sample is the exporter to a given destination for a good 
belonging to a given industry is constructed for each industry and destination as the ratio 
of imports from that country to the given destination over total imports to that 
destination. For each destination country and industry, we construct a weighted price as 
the sum of weighted exporting country prices, where the weights are simply the ratios 
from above and as described in detail in the data section. Finally, the prices in the 
destination country are compared to this weighted sum. 
 Once again, we estimate an equation similar to equation (2.3) where source κ  is 
now a weighted sum of probable exporters and these probabilities are obtained as 
described above. In Table 2.7, we report estimates from this specification. The price data 
have already been cleansed of outliers following CTZ. However, the trade quantities used  
here introduce an additional source of outliers given the well known measurement 
problems with trade flows. Thus, in order to handle outliers, we minimize an absolute 
loss function and obtain the median estimator, so that coefficients are estimated by  
minimizing absolute deviations from the median rather than squared deviations from the 
mean.26 Since as an estimate of central tendency the median is not greatly affected by 
outliers as the mean, this alleviates the outliers problem.27 
 
                                               
26
 We also tried the Cook’s D criterion to identify outliers which are then assigned smaller weights relative 
to other observations using iteratively re-weighted least square robust regressions. This method assigns a 
weight to each observation, with well-behaved less influential observations assigned higher weights, and 
only very extreme outliers completely removed from the sample. Results were very similar to those in 
Table 1.7. 
 
27
 Similarly to demeaning explanatory variables in our OLS regressions previously, we now remove the 
median from all explanatory variables so that the constant is interpreted as the price deviation relative to the 
source at median levels of distance, real GDP per-capita, and population size in the sample. 
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Table 2.7 Regressions Using Comparisons Relative to Trade-weighted  
Probabilistic Exporter (with GDP per-capita) 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10.  The eight countries in the 1975 sample 
are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. Greece, Spain 
and Portugal are added in 1980, and Austria added in 1985. 
 
The estimated coefficients for distance reported in Table 1.7 are estimated 
precisely and are always positive for 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990. The estimated price 
elasticity of distance is as high as 8.0 percent in 1975 but declines down to 4.4 percent by 
1990. These estimates taken in their totality suggest that transport costs are important for  
the determination of international price differences. Moreover, these estimates –using 
actual realizations of trade flows across countries- offer a clear improvement relative to 
those obtained using arbitrary comparisons in Table 2.1, but are qualitatively similar to 
those obtained assuming the most productive country in an industry to be the exporter for 
products of that industry. The estimates of the impact of the local cost component of trade 
 1975 1980 1985 1990  
 Model1 Model1 Model1 Model1  
Population -.037* (-8.36) 
-.025* 
(-5.10) 
-.056* 
(-13.66) 
-.044* 
(-12.28) 
 
GDP per-capita .268* (8.09) 
.292* 
(9.24) 
.279* 
(11.35) 
.251* 
(12.48) 
 
Distance .080* (6.03) 
.044* 
(4.01) 
.047* 
(4.97) 
.044* 
(5.28) 
 
Constant .021* (3.63) 
.037* 
(5.42) 
.056* 
(10.25) 
.042* 
(8.45) 
 
Pseudo R2 (in percentage) 3.4 1.3 2.4 1.9  
Observations 2759 3392 7322 6848 
 
Countries 8 11 12 12 
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costs reported in Table 2.7 are positive and precisely estimated for each year in our 
sample, with a price elasticity ranging from about 29 percent in 1980 down to about 25 
percent in 1990. The size of the population is consistently estimated to have a negative 
impact on prices with estimated negative price elasticity, ranging from 2.5 percent in 
1980 and 5.6 in 1985. Finally, the estimate of the constant term tells us that the importing 
country typically had prices which were 4.2 percent higher than the source at median 
levels of the explanatory variables in 1990.As a robustness check to the use of GDP per-
capita, we utilize industry-specific real wage rates and report corresponding results in 
Table 2.8. Here, we do not consider the 1975 cross-section since the wage measure is not 
available for that year.   
As expected, the real wage rate has a strong positive impact on prices, while 
population enters negatively in all cross-sections. The estimated price elasticity of 
distance ranges from a high of 5.2 percent in 1980 down to 3.8 percent in 1990. 
Finally, we consider VAT differences as an additional explanation of price differences 
across countries and report results for this specification in Table 2.9. VAT differences 
have a strong but declining positive impact on price differences ranging from 112 percent 
in 1975 down to 61 percent in 1990 as tax rates become more homogeneous over the 
period. The estimated effect of distance ranges from a high of 7.5 percent in 1975 down 
to 3.1 percent in 1990. Similarly, the price elasticity of the local component of 
distribution costs captured by GDP per-capita is estimated positive and significant for all 
cross-sections. The impact of population size on prices is again negative across the board. 
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Table 2.8 Regressions Using Comparisons Relative to Trade-weighted 
Probabilistic Exporter (with Real Wage Rate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10.  The ten countries in the 1980 sample are: 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Portugal and the UK. 
Austria added in 1985. The Netherland is not included in the 1985 cross-section because of 
insufficient number of wage data. 
 
 When we use the real wage rate instead of GDP per-capita, for Table 2.10, VAT 
again has strong but declining positive effect on prices for all years, ranging from 89 
percent in 1980 down to 61.5 percent in 1990. Similarly the real wage rate has strong 
positive effect on price differences for all years. On the other hand, population enters 
negatively, and significantly for 1985 and 1990 but statistically insignificant for 1980. As 
usual, the effect of distance decreases monotonically by more than half; from 6.3 percent 
in 1980 down to 3.1 percent in 1990. 
 1980 1985 1990  
 Model1 Model1 Model1 
Population -.010*** (-1.85) 
-.060* 
(-14.69) 
-.049* 
(-10.79) 
Real Wage Rate .134* (9.25) 
.147* 
(13.08) 
.141* 
(10.58) 
Distance .052* (2.89) 
.040* 
(2.56) 
.038** 
(2.54) 
Constant .001 (0.10) 
-.001 
(-0.16) 
.030* 
(5.06) 
Pseudo R2 (in percentage) 2.0 4.1 2.7 
Observations 2766 5423 5910 
Countries 10 10 11 
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 So far we have not accounted for consumption of domestic production. We now 
address this shortcoming of our analysis by allowing for the possibility that a product 
consumed at home can be an import or produced domestically.  Domestically consumed 
production of country i for industry h is defined as the difference between total output of 
country i for industry h and exports of country i for that industry. As we did previously, 
in order to increase the likelihood that a certain good we consider in the price comparison 
is actually imported from an EU country, we consider a within-sample import ratio of 50 
percent as a cutoff point. Results are reported in Table 1.11 to 1.14.28 
As we can se in Table 2.11, when domestic production is considered distance coefficient 
fall for all three cross-sections relative to what is reported in Table 2.7, perhaps reflecting 
lower within-country transport cost. For example, for 1985 the estimated distance 
coefficient decreases from 4.7 percent to 1.4 percent. Moreover, we see again a tendency 
for a monotonically declining impact of distance over time as this falls from 1.6 in 1980 
down to 1.1 in 1990. The domestic distribution cost as proxied by real GDP per-capita is 
similar to the specification without domestically consumed production for all three cross-
sections. Finally, the price elasticity of population is estimated to be negative and 
significant for all cross-sections. In Table 2.12, we report estimates obtained by replacing 
real GDP per-capita with the real wage rate. Accounting for the effect of domestically 
consumed production, price elasticities for distance and real wage rate are positive and 
                                               
28
 We cannot use the year 1975 since we do not have total output data for these countries. We also note that 
domestic production is calculated at 3-digit aggregation, the weights are generated at that level when we 
run the regressions with domestic production. The estimates without domestic production were generated 
by using weights in 4-digits. For the sake of comparability we also run the regressions without domestic 
production by using weights in 3-digits and estimates were very close to the ones reported in Tables 2.7 to 
2.10. 
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Table 2.9 Regressions Using Comparisons Relative to Trade-weighted 
 Probabilistic Exporter with VAT (with GDP per-capita) 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10.  The eight countries in the 1975 sample 
are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. Austria added 
in 1985.Grrece, Portugal, and Spain are added in 1990 since VAT is not observed for these countries 
except in the 1990 sample 
 
significant in all three cross- sections while the price elasticity for population is always 
estimated to be negative and statistically significant. Again, we see a decline in the price 
elasticity with respect to distance from 1.4 percent in 1980 down to 0.9 percent in 1990. 
Finally we include VAT differences as an explanatory variable and report the 
results in Table 2.13. VAT differences have positive and significant effects for all years. 
Similarly, the distance and GDP per-capita coefficient are estimated to be positive and 
population negative and significant for all cross-sections. Estimates for the specification 
 
 1975 1980 1985 1990  
 Model1 Model1 Model1 Model1  
Population -.010** (-2.31) 
-.011** 
(-1.99) 
-.041* 
(-8.71) 
-.029* 
(-6.87) 
 
GDP per-capita .253* (8.42) 
.270* 
(6.89) 
.180* 
(5.17) 
.186* 
(8.12) 
 
Distance .075* (6.21) 
.045* 
(3.51) 
.058* 
(5.39) 
.031* 
(3.49) 
 
VAT 1.12* (10.18) 
.804* 
(5.51) 
.748* 
(6.29) 
.606* 
(6.53) 
 
Constant .012** (2.23) 
.025* 
(3.86) 
.043* 
(8.82) 
.028* 
(5.11) 
 
Pseudo R2 (in percentage) 5.6 2.8 4.5 2.2  
Observations 2759 2775 5840 6848  
Countries 8 8 9 12 
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Table 2.10 Regressions Using Comparisons Relative to Trade-weighted  
Probabilistic Exporter with VAT (with Real Wage Rate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10.  The seven countries in the 1980 sample 
are: Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK. Austria added in 1985. 
Greece, Portugal and Spain are added in 1990 while the Netherland is not included in the 1985 cross-
section because of insufficient number of wage data. 
 
with real wage rates and VAT differences as explanatory variables reported in Table 2.14 
are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2.13, with all variables having expected signs 
and statistically significant. The coefficient estimate for distance ranges from 1.0 percent 
in 1980 down to 0.7 percent in 1990. The impact of VAT on price differences falls from a 
high of 23 percent in 1980 down to 9.4 percent in 1990 as these rates become more 
homogenized across countries over the period. 
 1980 1985 1990  
 Model1 Model1 Model1  
Population .006 (1.45) 
-.045* 
(-9.23) 
-.035* 
(-7.03) 
 
Real Wage Rate .119* (7.90) 
.080* 
(4.28) 
.111* 
(7.99) 
 
Distance .063* (4.31) 
.048** 
(2.49) 
.031** 
(2.01) 
 
VAT .893* (7.77) 
.869* 
(7.86) 
.615* 
(5.74) 
 
Constant .009 (1.58) 
.015** 
(2.22) 
.023* 
(3.86) 
 
Pseudo R2 (in percentage) 3.5 7.6 3.1  
Observations 2164 3975 5910  
Countries 7 7 11 
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Table 2.11 Regressions Using Comparisons Relative to Trade-weighted  
Probabilistic Exporter with Domestic Production (with GDP per-capita) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10.  The ten countries in the 1980 sample are: 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Portugal and the UK. 
Austria added in 1985.  
 
2.4 Heterogeneity in Transport Costs Across Industries 
 We have shown that once we utilize information regarding the source of products 
sold in any two locations, transportation costs as measured by distance are estimated to 
be important in determining deviations from the law-of-one-price (LOP) for individual 
goods. Moreover, distance has been shown to have a positive significant and robust 
impact on absolute price dispersion in our sample of bilateral country comparisons. Here, 
we consider a specification with industry-specific distance coefficients that aims to 
explore the relative importance of transportation costs across different industries. This is  
 
 1980 1985 1990  
 Model1 Model1 Model1  
Population -0.25* (-27.85) 
-.036* 
(-55.32) 
-.031* 
(-31.97) 
 
GDP per-capita .268* (37.88) 
.277* 
(67.03) 
.202* 
(25.18) 
 
Distance .016* (10.95) 
.014* 
(13.10) 
.011* 
(6.51) 
 
Constant .004* (5.99) 
.014* 
(29.38) 
.012* 
(14.24) 
 
Pseudo R2 (in percentage) 2.8 3.8 2.3  
Observations 3630 6399 5555  
Countries 10 11 11 
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Table 2.12 Regressions Using Comparisons Relative to Trade-weighted  
Probabilistic Exporter with Domestic Production (with Real Wage Rate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10.  The ten countries in the 1980 sample are: 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Portugal and the UK. 
Austria added in 1985, while the Netherlands is not included in the 1985 cross-section because of the 
insufficient number of wage data. 
 
again in line with Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) who consider heterogeneity in 
transport costsin their extension of Eaton and Kortum (2001) who assumed identical trade 
costs. As was the case with the measures of tradability and local factor input content used 
in Model 2 previously, industry-specific factors are informative about the absolute level 
of price dispersion but not about whether a price is higher or lower in certain geographic 
location. Thus, we consider the model with absolute price deviations as in Model 2, 
rather than the directional regression from Model 1. 
 
 1980 1985 1990  
 Model1 Model1 Model1  
Population -0.24* (-25.25) 
-.037* 
(-52.71) 
-.028* 
(-25.30) 
 
GDP per-capita .335* (37.30) 
.309* 
(47.28) 
.193* 
(21.92) 
 
Distance .011* (6.87) 
.014* 
(11.09) 
.009* 
(4.79) 
 
VAT .068* (6.28) 
.058* 
(6.93) 
.085* 
(6.92) 
 
Constant .002* (2.59) 
.003* 
(4.44) 
.013* 
(13.95) 
 
Pseudo R2 (in percentage) 5.3 6.5 2.6  
Observations 2810 4917 5555  
Countries 7 8 11 
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Table 2.13 Regressions Using Comparisons Relative to Trade-weighted 
Probabilistic Exporter with Domestic Production with VAT (with GDP per-capita) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10.  The seven countries in the 1980 sample 
are: Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK. Austria added in 1985, 
and Greece, Portugal, and Spain are added in 1990 as VAT is not observed for these countries except 
in the 1990 sample.  
 
Specifically, we consider a slightly modified version of Model 2 adding now 
industry-specific distance coefficients and excluding the industry-specific tradeability 
measure from CTZ. We implement this by utilizing information on the source of 
individual products to consider price comparisons relative to the most productive country 
in each industry. 
Once we obtain industry-specific distance coefficients, we then rank the industries 
 
 1980 1985 1990  
 Model1 Model1 Model1  
Population -0.10* (-13.92) 
-.029* 
(-57.85) 
-.027* 
(-27.53) 
 
Real Wage Rate .080* (30.01) 
.094* 
(62.63) 
.065* 
(18.38) 
 
Distance .014* (11.29) 
.007* 
(7.65) 
.009* 
(5.44) 
 
Constant .002* (3.10) 
.002* 
(5.12) 
.008* 
(9.62) 
 
Pseudo R2 (in percentage) 1.7 4.5 2.1  
Observations 3537 5423 5454  
Countries 10 10 11 
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Table 2.14 Regressions Using Comparisons Relative to Trade-weighted  
Probabilistic Exporter with Domestic Production with VAT (with Real Wage Rate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10.  The seven countries in the 1980 sample 
are: Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK. Austria added in 1985, 
and Greece, Portugal, and Spain are added in 1990 as VAT is not observed for these countries except 
in the 1990 sample. The Netherlands is not included in the 1985 cross-section because of the 
insufficient number of wage data. 
 
according to how high the distance coefficient is estimated to be, with the industry with 
the lowest distance coefficient ranked first and the one with the highest coefficient ranked 
last. To see how this ranking relates to the other measures of the importance of 
transportation costs we also report the ranking of the industries according to (1) the 
average value of goods within that industry classification, and (2) the degree of 
tradeability characterizing a certain industry.  To obtain the “value” of the typical good in 
 1980 1985 1990  
 Model1 Model1 Model1  
Population -005* (-5.21) 
-.027* 
(-58.17) 
-.023* 
(-23.12) 
 
Real Wage Rate .149* (27.51) 
.232* 
(40.94) 
.062* 
(17.36) 
 
Distance .010* (6.94) 
.008* 
(8.09) 
.007* 
(4.26) 
 
VAT .229* (4.90) 
.057* 
(10.13) 
.094* 
(8.12) 
 
Constant .001*** (1.88) 
.002* 
(3.59) 
.009* 
(10.62) 
 
Pseudo R2 (in percentage) 3.4 10.0 2.6  
Observations 2743 3975 5454  
Countries 7 7 11 
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each industry used for ranking in Table 2.15, we average the common currency prices of 
each good across countries and then aggregate this average price across all goods that fall 
in the same ISIC classification. Assuming a fixed component of transportation costs, then 
the per unit transportation cost attributed to this fixed component should decline with the 
value of the good considered in column (1) of Table 2.15, with expensive goods having 
lower per unit costs. Tradeability is constructed as described in the data section. As we 
have argued there, tradeability has a direct interpretation as an inverse measure of 
effective trade costs. 
If the above reasoning is valid, and as long as our industry-specific distance 
coefficients capture the relative importance of transportation costs across industries, these 
estimates should be closely related to the measures of value and tradeability considered 
here. Indeed, the correlation between the value ranking in column (1) and the distance 
coefficient ranking in column (3) is of the right sign, at 59 percent, and statistically 
significant beyond the one percent level. Moreover, the correlation between tradeability 
ranking in column (2) and the distance coefficient ranking in column (3) is similar in 
value and again statistically significant beyond the one percent level. As a robustness 
check, we run the regressions using wage rates in place of GDP per-capita. In this case, 
the correlation between the value ranking and the distance coefficients ranking is 35 
percent and that between tradeability ranking and the distance coefficients ranking is 45 
percent, both statistically significant at the five percent level. 
 
 
  
 
58 
2.5 Conclusion 
The estimation of trade costs is important for a number of international 
macroeconomic models with implications regarding price differences across countries. 
Transport costs are one component of trade costs that has received particular attention 
in the empirical literature. As policy-related costs of trade decline over time, the relative 
importance of transport costs can be increasing even as technological progress reduces 
their size over time. Moreover, progress in transport technologies might allow previously 
non-traded goods with higher per unit transport cost to enter international trade. Thus, the 
relevance of transport costs in determining price wedges and international quantity flows 
might remain important even as technological progress lowers the level of transport costs 
for any one good.  
To enable us to estimate the costs of trading a good internationally, we rank countries 
based on their productivity in individual industries and compute product-specific 
international price differences relative to the most productive location for each industry. 
We have also used information on bilateral trade flows to determine the probable source 
of each product as a weighted average of the countries from which a destination country 
actually imports from. Identifying the source has made it possible to consider price 
comparisons that are relevant to the direction of trade and trade costs. 
One commonly used measure for transport costs is physical distance from the origin 
of each product. Here, distance relative to the most productive country has a precisely 
estimated positive impact on international deviations from LOP and this is larger than 
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Table 2.15 Ranking Industries According to Relative Transportation Costs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Industry Description 
Ranking 
according to 
valuea 
Ranking 
according to 
tradeabiltyb 
Ranking 
according to 
distancec 
Transport equipment 1 8 5 
Machinery except electrical 2 3 1 
Machinery electric 3 10 10 
Other manufactured products 4 2 6 
Professional and scientific equipment 5 1 15 
Leather products 6 4 8 
Furniture except metal 7 18 14 
Wearing apparel except footwear 8 9 3 
Footwear except rubber or plastic 9 5 4 
Rubber products 10 13 9 
Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 11 15 7 
Fabricated metal products 12 16 16 
Textiles 13 7 13 
Printing and publishing 14 23 21 
Other chemicals 15 11 17 
Beverages 16 19 19 
Glass Products 17 20 20 
Tobacco 18 21 12 
Paper and products 19 12 2 
Other non-metallic mineral products 20 22 23 
Food products 21 17 11 
Non-ferrous metals 22 6 18 
Iron and steel 23 14 22 
Rank correlation with column (3) 0.59 0.57 1.0 
 
Notes: a: Ranking from more expensive to cheaper goods, b: Ranking from highly tradeable industries 
to low tradeability industries, c: Ranking of industry-specific distance coefficients from to high 
estimated price impact. These coefficient estimates were based on price comparisons relative to the 
most productive country in each industry for 1985. 
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the estimates obtained when arbitrarily assigning an equal probability of being source to 
each country. Our estimates of the impact of transport costs using actual realizations of 
trade flows across countries are qualitatively similar to those obtained under the 
assumption that the most productive country in an industry is the sole exporter for that 
industry. This confirms that productivity is a strong predictor of the direction of trade and 
that the assumption of the most productive country in an industry being the main exporter 
for all products of that industry is not a bad approximation. 
An interesting feature that emerges is the falling importance of transport costs as 
witnessed in the declining estimated coefficient for the impact of physical distance on 
prices during the period from 1975 to 1990. This is consistent with economic intuition as 
transport technologies have been improving over time. Moreover, distance also matters 
for absolute price dispersion and so does the industry-specific measure of transport costs. 
We also find that distribution costs are important in determining international 
deviations from LOP. That is, we re-confirm the well-known fact that countries with 
higher income per-capita –and thus a higher cost for the local inputs component- have 
higher prices. However, the small and sometimes insignificant impact of income on 
absolute price deviations suggests that for this group of countries that have relatively 
similar income levels, it is not the case that the price gap becomes larger as the income 
gap increases. At the same time, the industry-specific measure of local input costs has a 
positive impact on absolute price dispersion. 
We conclude that utilizing relative productivity along with relative prices from survey 
data can help in identifying trade costs and their role in segmenting product markets. 
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However, future work should aspire to utilize microeconomic information on trade flows 
along with microeconomic relative prices in order to further improve our understanding 
of trade costs. 
In addition, market size appears to be an important explanation for international price 
dispersion. As long as demand elasticities are positively related to the size of the market, 
this latter finding is consistent with markups being higher in smaller (less competitive) 
markets. Finally, VAT rate differences have been very strong determinants of price 
differences across the European countries in the sample. However, the impact of these tax 
differences has been declining throughout the period from 1975 to 1990 as would be 
expected from the EU policy of tax harmonization. Overall, the data is consistent with 
models where transport costs, distribution costs, market size, and taxes play important 
roles in the determination of international price differences. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL PRICE DISPERSION and MARKET STRUCTURE 
3.1 Introduction 
As we discussed in Chapter 2, according to Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis 
(2005) (CTZ) the law-of-one-price (LOP) and purchasing power parity (PPP) are about 
the cross-sectional distribution of international relative prices. By utilizing 
microeconomic price levels for a broad set of range of goods and services in all European 
Union (EU) countries over five-year intervals between 1975 and 1990, CTZ analyze the 
absolute law-of-one-price deviations. Their results demonstrate that good-by-good 
measures of cross-sectional price dispersion are negatively related to the tradeability of 
the goods and positively related to the share of non-traded inputs. In the previous chapter, 
we estimate an absolute price dispersions model based on the theoretical framework in 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). Our results suggest that absolute price dispersions 
are largely determined by the potential determinants discussed in this framework, namely 
trade costs, goods- specific characteristics, and the differences in taxes and markups.  
In this chapter, we try to infer how price dispersion and market structure are 
related. More specifically in this chapter, the good-by-good price dispersions model 
discussed in CTZ and absolute price dispersions model discussed in Chapter 2 are 
estimated for homogeneous goods and differentiated goods separately. Differential 
impacts of the potential determinants of absolute price dispersion for homogeneous goods 
and differentiated goods enable us to conclude that market structure has significant 
impact on absolute international price dispersions. 
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According to Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), trade costs are large; they 
dominate production costs, vary across countries, and have two components: 
transportation cost and distribution costs.  Transportation costs can be further divided in 
to two sub-categories as direct elements of transportation cost, such as freight charges 
and insurance shipments, and indirect elements such as holding cost during shipment, 
inventory cost, and preparation cost. 
Similarly, Hummels (2001) argues that trade barriers play the most important role 
in models in international specialization and trade, therefore empirical works on those 
areas should take into account trade costs. However, assessing the actual value of such 
costs is a difficult task. Therefore, different studies in this area use different proxies for 
trade costs. For instance, Hummels (2001) provides a new data set on freight rates for a 
number of importers and estimates the relation between freight rates and physical 
distance between trading partners and his results confirm that trade costs are large and 
import choices are made so as to minimize transportation cost. 
Another proxy for transportation cost is cif/fob ratios29, and Bergstrand and Egger 
(forthcoming) use this measure in order to infer the importance of transportation cost in 
intra-industry trade. 
Finally, physical distance between countries is the commonly used measure of 
transportation cost. Eaton and Kortum (2002) indicate that, trade diminishes dramatically 
with distance and prices vary across locations with greater distance between places 
                                               
29
 For the discussion on the problems associated with cif/fob ratios, please refer to Hummels and 
Lugovskyy (2003). 
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farther apart. Rauch (1999) and Evans (2003) can be given as examples for the studies 
use distance as a proxy for transportation cost in quantity regressions. Crucini, Telmer 
and Zachariadis (2000) use distance as a measure of transportation cost in order to 
analyze the geography of price dispersion and their results show a strong positive relation 
between distance between the countries and price differences. 
However, according to Berthelon and Freund (2004), there are vast differences in 
the distance elasticity of trade across products. Similarly, Crucini, Telmer and 
Zachariadis (2000) argue that, under monopolistic competition, assuming that goods are 
homogeneous when in fact they are different varieties of the same good would lead to 
unfounded rejection of law-of-one-price (LOP). Rauch (1999) is the one of the most 
appreciated works which considers the abovementioned issue. According to Rauch 
(1999), heterogeneity of products along with the dimensions of both characteristics and 
quality affect prices. In order to control for heterogeneity, Rauch (1999) split 
internationally traded commodities into three categories as commodities traded in 
organized exchanges, commodities with reference price, and differentiated commodities.  
According to the theoretical framework discussed in Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2004), differences in markups are one of the potential determinants of international price 
dispersion. Similarly, Goldberg and Verboven (2001) argue that differences in markups 
are one of the potential sources for the differences in car prices across Europe. Product 
market competition is a multidimensional process and markup over marginal cost can be 
a sign of the level of competition in the market.  However, calculation of markup is 
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problematic since marginal costs are unobservable.30 Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) 
argue that larger markets are more competitive, and in more competitive markets 
producers must recover their fixed costs by selling more at lower markups. Similarly, due 
to Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), market size affects the toughness of competition. Bigger 
markets exhibit higher levels of product variety and host more productive firms that set 
lower markups and lower prices. By following these arguments, in Chapter 2, population 
size differences are used in order to control for markup differences. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the 
motivation behind our empirical application. Data are described in Section 3.3. Section 
3.4 presents and discusses the estimation procedure and our results. Finally, Section 3.5 
concludes. 
3.2 Motivation 
Imperfect market structure plays a significant role in explaining purchasing power 
parity (PPP) deviations. Cheung, Chinn and Fuji (1999) argue that, a firm’s pricing power 
in monopolistic competition is determined by the elasticity of demand which depends on 
the substitutability among varieties within the industry.  Therefore, product 
differentiation creates more dispersed prices and it can be a sign of market power.  
In our study, we use the Rauch (1999) commodity classification in order to infer 
the effect of market structure on international price dispersion.  Rauch (1999) divided 
                                               
30
 There are different proxies proposed by studies in this area. For instance, Hall (1988) uses the Solow 
residual in order to calculate markups. Nevertheless, Hall’s method requires many different instrumental 
variables and suffers from an identification problem. Roeger (1995) propose a different method based on 
price –based Solow residuals in order to solve the identification problem in Hall (1988). However, method 
used by Roeger (1995) overestimates markups. Finally, Gali (1995) uses the inverse of the share of labor in 
total cost as a proxy for markup. 
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internationally traded commodities into three groups. The first group is called 
commodities traded in “organized exchanges”. The second group is the commodities 
those are not traded in organized exchanges perhaps because the market is too “thin” so 
the price at the equilibrium would not cover the “set-up cost of the organized exchanges, 
but possess a “reference price”.  Although these goods are not traded in an organized 
market, their prices can be quoted without mentioning the name of the producers since 
they are not branded commodities. Those characteristics of reference priced goods 
distinguish them from the goods traded in organized exchanges and the goods that belong 
to the third and the last category in classification; differentiated goods. Differentiated 
commodities do not possess a reference price, and their prices at any location must be 
adjusted for multidimensional differences in the good characteristics, which depend on 
the varieties available at the location and consumer preferences (Rauch, 1999). In other 
words, for differentiated goods, the price the monopolistically-competitive firm could 
charge depends on the elasticity of substitution between the varieties of the good 
(Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis, 2000). Since having a reference price distinguishes 
homogeneous goods from the differentiated goods, according to Rauch (1999), the 
commodities traded in organized exchanges and those that possess a reference price can 
be considered as homogeneous commodities. 
First, we analyze the effect of market structure on good-by-good price 
dispersions. The model we use originates from the one used by CTZ in which 
international price dispersion is characterized in terms of the characteristics of goods. 
According to CTZ, the first characteristic which determines international price dispersion 
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is the “tradeability” of the good that is measured as the extent to which final goods are 
traded, and the second one is the share of non-traded inputs in the total cost of the goods. 
The expectation is a negative relation between tradeability and price dispersion since 
tradeability can be considered as the inverse of the industry specific transportation cost, 
and a positive relation between the non-traded input share and  price dispersion since one 
would expect international price dispersion to be present for all retail prices; however, it 
would be larger for the goods for which the share of non-traded input is higher (Crucini, 
Telmer and Zachariadis, 2000). In the model, differences in tax rates are controlled by 
two group-specific dummy variables for classes of goods that are likely to face higher 
taxes and by value added tax (VAT) rates across countries and industries. 
For different commodity types, we expect differential impact from the good 
characteristics on good-by-good price dispersions. More specifically, we anticipate a 
larger impact of tradeability and the non-traded input share for the homogeneous goods. 
Results in CTZ demonstrate that goods with higher tradability have lower price 
dispersion. However, the prices of the differentiated goods are determined by many 
different factors and since they are branded commodities, the producers of them will have 
pricing power. Therefore, we expect that the same amount of increase in the tradeability 
of good will decrease the price dispersion for homogeneous goods more. In addition to 
that, recall in Chapter 2, that the non-traded input share is considered as the industry-
specific distribution cost. Since most of the homogeneous goods are bulky and/or 
perishable, their value/weight ratio will be lower than the ones for differentiated goods. 
So, assuming a fixed component to trade cost, expensive goods will have a lower per-unit 
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cost. Based on this, we may conclude that the effect of non-traded input share on price 
dispersion for homogeneous goods would be higher relative to its effect for differentiated 
goods. 
For the second model, our point of departure is the theoretical framework 
discussed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). Specifically, we construct the same 
absolute price dispersion discussed in Chapter 2 for homogeneous goods and 
differentiated goods separately in order to distinguish the effect of market structure on 
absolute price dispersion. As we did in Chapter 2, we utilize the physical distance 
between countries as a measure of the transport cost, the industry-specific real wage rates 
as measure of the local distribution cost, and population differences as a measure for 
mark-up differences. Tax differences are controlled by the dummy variables mentioned 
above, and where broadly available, by country and industry-specific VAT differences. 
As it is explained in the previous chapter, taking the absolute values solves the 
“averaging-out” problem discussed in Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2004), so 
distance can be used as a meaningful proxy for transportation cost even in the absence of 
the information of the source country for the product. By following Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2004), industry-specific tradability variable is used in order to control for the 
heterogeneity of transportation cost across industries. Furthermore, Rauch (1999) 
mentions the importance of controlling tradability of the different good categories when 
we attempt to assess the importance of distance. Similarly, in order to control for the 
heterogeneity across industries from the perspective of distribution cost, we utilize the 
non-traded input share as a measure of industry-specific local distribution cost. 
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Results presented in Chapter 2 show that the country-specific and the industry 
specific aspects of transportation costs and distribution costs, taxes and market size play 
important roles in the determination of absolute price dispersions. Henceforth, in this 
chapter, we attempt to infer the effect of these potential determinants for homogeneous 
goods and differentiated goods, separately. Since distance indicates the time elapsed 
during the shipment. For perishable goods the probability of surviving intact during the 
transit will be lower. Because of this and based on the above discussion, we expect higher 
price elasticity of transportation cost and distribution cost for homogeneous goods. 
Finally, since producers of differentiated goods have market power, we expect the effect 
of markup differences will be larger for differentiated goods. 
3.3 Data Section 
For the first model, let us denote ijP  as the price of good i in country j in units of 
some numeraire country currency. Thereafter, we can define the log deviations from the 
geometric-average European price as follows: 
                         
1
ln lnMij ij ijjq P P M== −∑                                 (3.1) 
where M is the number of countries in our data. 
 For the second model, let us denote the law-of-one-price (LOP) deviations as 
                                    ( )lnijk jk ij ikg e P P=                                             (3.2) 
where  ijP  and ikP  are local currency prices of good i in country j and k respectively, and 
jke  is the nominal exchange rate of country j in terms of country k currency. 
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 As in the Chapter 2, common currency prices are obtained from CTZ with the 
outliers having been removed from the data.  Similarly, value added (VAT) information, 
country specific dummy variables for large cars and vices are used in both specification, 
and population size, real wage rates, bilateral distance we use in the second specification 
are obtained from the same sources discussed in the data section of Chapter 2.31 
 Based on the discussion above, product differentiation is used as a measure of 
market structure. We utilize the Rauch (1999) classification in order to categorize goods 
in our data.  Rauch (1999) has assigned 643 three-digit and four-digit Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) level industries according to whether they are 
traded in an organized exchange, or not traded in an organized exchange but having some 
“quoted” reference price, and finally not having any quoted price and therefore treated as 
differentiated. Data for Rauch classification and the industry concordances between ISIC 
Revision 2 and SITC Revision 2 which is used in order to match the Rauch32 
classification with CTZ price data are obtained from Jon Haveman’s web page.33  
Each good is assigned to a four-digit Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) category to be assigned into one of the good categories discussed in the Rauch 
classification. Rauch (1999) argues that possessing a reference price distinguishes 
homogeneous goods from differentiated goods. Moreover, the numbers of commodities 
                                               
31
 For detailed discussion about these variables and data sources, please refer Chapter 2. 
 
32
 Because of the ambiguities in the trade data, Rauch (1999) defines two different types of commodity 
classifications. The first classification is called the liberal classification. In the “liberal” commodity 
classification, the number of differentiated goods is at the minimum number. The second one is called the 
“conservative” commodity classification and it contains the maximum number of differentiated goods. For 
this study, the liberal classification is used, however we also estimate the specifications by using the 
conservative classification, and the results were very similar to the ones reported in this chapter. 
 
33
 www.macalester.edu/econdata/page/haveman 
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traded in organized exchanges are quite limited.  Therefore, goods traded in organized 
exchanges and reference priced goods are combined as homogeneous goods.  
CTZ  data contain many price observations for different brands of the same good. 
According to Rauch (1999), homogeneous goods possess a reference price and they are 
not “branded”. However, because price data is more disaggregated than the Rauch 
classification, some branded goods are classified as homogeneous goods when the Rauch 
classification is merged with CTZ price data. In order to be consistent with  Rauch 
(1999), these goods have been dropped from the data. In addition to that, by following 
Bergstrand and Egger (forthcoming), we conclude that vices (alcoholic beverages and 
tobacco products) are faced with important product differentiation. Therefore, branded 
goods in the vices category are considered as differentiated goods although according to 
the Rauch classification, some of them are classified as the commodities with a reference 
price.34 
 Our first specification, by following CTZ, relates the good-by-good measures of 
cross-sectional price dispersion with tradeability of the good and the share of the non-
traded inputs required for production. These two industry-specific variables are also used 
in the second model in order to control for the heterogeneity across industries in 
transportation cost and distribution cost, respectively. As in the second chapter, both of 
the variables are obtained from CTZ35. Both tradeability and non-traded input share 
                                               
34
 We also estimate the specifications by keeping the goods in the categories proposed by Rauch (1999). 
This change does not bring any important changes in the results. 
 
35
 Recall from Chapter 2, tradeability defined as the ratio of the total trade in each industry in our sample 
divided by the total output of the same industry across the same countries, and the shares of the non-traded 
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variables are constructed in a more aggregate way than the Rauch (1999) classification. 
As a result, goods belong to different product types may have the same tradeability and 
the non-traded input share levels which makes it difficult to distinguish the effect of 
market structure on price dispersion. In order to cope with this issue, we generate the 
Rauch-category weighted tradeability and the non-traded input share variables. 
 Data required for calculating weights are obtained from the dataset World Trade 
Flows: 1962-2000. This dataset reports the bilateral trade data in the four-digit SITC 
classification. In order to calculate weights, first we denote mjks  as the trade in the 
industry m between countries j and k. Then we proceed to define the total trade for each 
industry as 
1
Lm m
llS s==∑  where L is the number of bilateral pairs that we have trade data 
for. Finally, for each ISIC code, we seek the share of each product category in the total 
trade by using the shares described above as weights for tradability and the non-traded 
input share. 
3.4 Estimation and Results  
In order to analyze the effect of market structure on international price dispersion, 
we use two different specifications. The first one investigates the effect of market 
structure on the good-by-good distributions of prices. The second specification attempts 
to show the impact of product differentiation on absolute price differences by using both 
country-specific and industry-specific potential determinants of price dispersion 
discussed in Chapter2. 
                                                                                                                                            
inputs required to produce the final goods are computed by CTZ from 1988 the United Kingdom (UK) 
input-output tables. 
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3.4.1 Market Structure and Good –by-Good Price Dispersion 
The first specification, originated from the model used by CTZ. Specifically, we 
estimate the following equation: 
0 1 2( | ) ln( ) ln( )ij i iVar q i trad nt residualα α α= + + +           (3.3) 
where ( | )ijVar q i is the sample variance of ijq  across countries j , trad  is the tradeability 
of goods and nt denotes the non-traded input share of the good. The results in CTZ 
demonstrate that good-by-good price dispersions which are measured by the sample 
variance of ijq  are negatively correlated with tradeability and positively correlated with 
the non-traded inputs required to produce the final good. Because of the reasons 
discussed in the above sections, when estimating the model for homogeneous goods and 
differentiated goods separately, we expect higher price elasticity estimates of both 
tradeability and the non-traded input share for homogeneous goods.  
 As it was mentioned, according to Cheung, Chinn and Fuji (1999) product 
differentiation creates more dispersed prices, and it can be a sign of market power.  We 
plot the estimate of the density of Var(qij|i)0.5 , the standard deviations of the law-of –one-
price deviation for good i across countries j36 . The visual evidence supports their 
argument. Estimates and t-statistics from the above specification with ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and correcting standard errors for the heteroskedasticity are presented in 
Table 3.1. 
 
                                               
36
 For the graphs of the empirical distributions of the standard deviations of LOP deviations for the other 
cross-sections please refer to Appendix A. 
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Figure 3.1 Empirical Distribution of Var(qij|i)0.5 for Homogeneous Goods-1990 
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Figure 3.2 Empirical Distribution of Var(qij|i)0.5 for Differentiated Goods-1990 
Model 1 reports the estimates for pooled data and they are consistent with the 
findings of CTZ for all four cross-sections. 37 Results show that, as in CTZ, the cross-
sectional price dispersion is negatively related with tradeability and positively related 
with the non-traded input share. For instance, for 1985, the price elasticity of tradeability 
and the non -traded input share are estimated as -5 percent and 5.5 percent respectively. 
                                               
37
 The  Rauch classification does not include services. Therefore, we re-estimate the model of CTZ by 
using the full sample in order to check the robustness of results to exclusion of services from the data. 
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 Model 2 and Model 3 present the results for homogeneous goods and 
differentiated goods respectively. For all four cross-sections, tradeability has consistently 
higher impact for homogeneous goods than differentiated goods. The impact of 
tradability on prices for differentiated goods is about half that of the homogeneous goods 
for 1980, 1985 and 1990. For example for 1990, price elasticity for tradeability is 
estimated -5.1 percent for homogeneous goods whereas only -2.2 percent for 
differentiated goods.  
 When we re-estimate Equation 3.1 for homogeneous goods and differentiated 
goods separately, our findings indicate that, there is a positive and significant relation 
between the non-traded input share and good specific price dispersion and estimates are 
consistently higher for homogeneous goods. For instance, for the year 1975, there is a 
positive and significant relation between the non-traded input share and price dispersion 
for homogeneous goods. However, the coefficient estimate of the non-traded input share 
for differentiated goods is statistically indistinguishable than zero for differentiated 
goods. For the year 1980, the impact of non-traded input share on price dispersion for 
differentiated goods is about the half of the homogeneous goods; 9.9 percent and 4.5 
percent respectively. Similarly, for 1985, price elasticity due to the non-traded input share 
is estimated as almost 8.6 percent regarding homogeneous goods and 4.6 percent and for 
differentiated goods, and for the year 1990, the price elasticity of the non-traded input 
share for homogeneous goods and for differentiated goods are estimated as 6.2 percent 
and 2.2 percent respectively.  
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Finally, we consider taxes as another potential determinant of price dispersion. As 
discussed in the above sections, taxes are controlled by industry and country specific 
value added taxes differences and two dummy variables, namely dummies for large cars 
and vices. Vices and large cars have large price dispersion which may be rather 
attributable to differences in excise taxes across countries (Crucini, Telmer and 
Zachariadis, 2000). We expect larger price dispersion for the goods belong to these 
specific categories. 
In order to calculate before-VAT prices, first let us denote ijP  as the after-VAT 
price of good i in country j in units of numeraire country currency and ijv  as the VAT 
rate for country j and good i. So we can further define (1 )ij ij ijP P v= +
∼
 where ijP
∼
 is the 
before-VAT price of good i in country j. Then we can transform the before-VAT price 
data ijP
∼
 into log deviations from the geometric average of European price as we did for 
the after-VAT prices: 
                          
1
ln( ) ln( )Mij ijij jq P P M== −∑
∼ ∼ ∼
                                 (3.4) 
where M is the number of countries in our sample. Finally, we can generate ( | )ijVar q i
∼
 as 
a measure of good-by-good price dispersions by using before-VAT prices. 
For this specification, we estimate the following model: 
0 1 2 3 4( | ) ln( ) ln( )i iijVar q i tr nt lc v residualsα α α α α= + + + + +
∼
         (3.5) 
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where lc  represents the large cars dummy , v  represents the dummy variable  for vices 
and all the other variables are the same as Equation 3.3. Results for this specification are 
presented in Table 3.2. 
As for the above specification, Model 1 summarizes the estimations for pooled 
data and Model 2 and Model 3 report the results for homogeneous goods and 
differentiated goods, respectively. Coefficient estimates of large cars and vices dummies 
have the anticipated positive signs except for 1975.  For the cross-sections 1975 and 
1990, for all three models, both tradability and the non-traded input share coefficients 
before and after the inclusion of taxes are nearly unchanged.  For 1980, the estimated 
coefficients for tradability for all three models are very similar to the results reported in 
Table 3.1, however, the coefficient estimate for the non-traded input share falls to 4.8 
percent relative to 5.7 percent for pooled data, to 8.9 percent relative to 9.9 percent for 
homogeneous goods and to 3.6 percent relative to 4.5 percent for differentiated goods. 
For year 1985, coefficient estimate of tradability in Model 2 falls about 20 percent, 
relative to the results before the inclusion of tax differences into the model, and finally 
the price elasticity of the non-treaded input share in Model 2 falls to 7.4 percent in Table 
3.2 relative to 8.6 percent in Table 3.1 and finally for Model 3 increases from 4.6 percent 
to 5.7 percent. 
We have reported two goodness of fit for the regressions (R2). R2 is the fraction of 
variance explained based on the raw data, and it is necessarily low and does not give a lot 
of information since it reflects the different levels of aggregation of the dependent 
variable and explanatory variables. When the raw price data is used, intersectoral price 
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dispersion can not be explained; therefore estimations will have low R2 values. (Crucini, 
Telmer and Zachariadis, 2000) In order to alleviate this problem, we follow CTZ and 
aggregate the data as the same level with explanatory variables. As we can see from 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, goodness-of-fit from aggregate regression (R2*) are higher than 
the ones that is obtained from raw data. 
3.4.2 Market Structure and Absolute Price Dispersion 
The second empirical analysis is based on the theoretical model discussed in 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). Specifically, we re-estimate the following equation 
for the pooled sample, for the homogeneous goods and for the differentiated goods 
separately: 
0 1 2 3 4
h
ijk jk jk jk h ijkg pop y dist Xα α α α α ε= + + + + +         (3.6) 
 
where ijkg  is the absolute value of the log deviation from the law-of-one-price for good i 
between countries j and k, jkpop  is the absolute value of the log difference in population 
size between countries j and k, hjky  is the absolute value of the log real wage rate 
differences between countries j and k for industry h, jkdist   the log distance between 
countries j and k, and hX  is a vector of industry and good specific variables; tradability 
of the good, the non-traded input share, and two dummy variables for specific good 
categories for which we have information about large tax differences.  
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Table 3.1 Good-by-Good Price Dispersion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  * p-value<1%, ** p-value<5%, *** p-value<10%. Model 1 is pooled data; Model 2 and Model 3 presented the results for homogeneous goods and differentiated goods 
respectively. The eight EU countries considered for 1975 are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. Greece, Portugal and 
Spain are added in 1980 and Austria in 1985. R2  is the goodness-of fit from raw data, R2* is the goodness of fit fro the regression for which the dependent variable is aggregated 
at the same level with explanatory variables 
 1975 1980 1985 1990 
             
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Tradeability -.028* (-4.50) 
-.129** 
(-2.29) 
-.023* 
(-4.15) 
-.040* 
(-4.62) 
-.071* 
(-3.08) 
-.033* 
(-3.23) 
-.050* 
(-7.43) 
-.070* 
(-3.06) 
-.034* 
(-4.55) 
-.039* 
(-6.81) 
-.051* 
(-2.70) 
-.022* 
(-3.22) 
Non-traded 
input share 
.026* 
(2.68) 
.137* 
(2.30) 
.010 
(0.73) 
.057* 
(4.65) 
.099* 
(3.94) 
.045* 
(3.07) 
.055* 
(6.19) 
.086* 
(3.99) 
.046* 
(4.22) 
.041* 
(5.05) 
.062* 
(3.61) 
.022** 
(2.21) 
Constant -.010 (-0.31) 
-.379*** 
(-1.88) 
.036 
(1.13) 
-.055 
(-1.65) 
-.176** 
(-2.15) 
-.026 
(-0.66) 
-.066* 
(-2.68) 
-.136** 
(-1.82) 
-.042 
(-1.43) 
-.037*** 
(-1.71) 
-.079 
(-1.28) 
-.010 
(-0.39) 
R2 .08 .14 .10 .08 .10 .07 .08 .06 .06 .07 .05 .03 
R2* .22 .48 .24 .25 .32 .23 .27 .18 .24 .34 .24 .27 
             
#  of 
observation 289 106 183 356 143 213 814 271 543 823 255 568 
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Estimates with ordinary least squares (OLS) and heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics 
are presented in Table 3.3. Model 1 reports the results for pooled sample estimation. Our 
findings are qualitatively similar to those presented in Chapter 2.  The coefficients for 
distance are estimated precisely and positive across the board and are as high as 8.3 
percent in 1980 but declines down to 4 percent in 1990. Moreover, the impact of distance 
on absolute price differences decreases monotonically through the period which is 
consistent with the findings of Rauch (1999). As in Chapter 2, absolute real wage rate 
differences that capture the local cost component attributed to labor but specific to each 
industry, enter in expected way for pooled data; estimated price elasticity of real wage is 
positive and significant for all cross-sections. Coefficient estimates for the industry-
specific tradeability variable indicate that, goods belonging to highly tradable industries 
will have lower price differences; furthermore, higher local input share means higher 
absolute price differences.   So, as in Chapter 2, both industry- specific and country-
specific local distribution cost matter for absolute price dispersions.  Dummies for large 
cars and vices also have positive and significant impact on absolute price differences. 
Finally, as in Chapter 2, population size has positive and significant impact for all three 
cross-sections which implies possible role for mark-up differences as a determinant of 
absolute price dispersions. 
Then, in order to evaluate the effect of market structure, we re-estimate the 
equation 3.6 for homogeneous goods and differentiated goods. Results are presented in 
Table 3.3 in Model 2 and Model 3, respectively indicate that, as distance between
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Table 3.2 Good-by-Good Price Dispersion with Tax 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  * p-value<1%, ** p-value<5%, *** p-value<10%. Model 1 is pooled data; Model 2 and Model 3 presented the results for homogeneous goods and differentiated goods 
respectively. The eight EU countries considered for 1975 are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. Greece, Portugal and 
Spain are added in 1980 and Austria in 1985. R2  is the goodness-of fit from raw data, R2* is the goodness of fit fro the regression for which the dependent variable is aggregated 
at the same level with explanatory variables. 
 1975 1980 1985 1990 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Tradeability -.028* (-4.45) 
-.127* 
(-2.24) 
-.023* 
(-4.01) 
-.040* 
(-4.85) 
-.073* 
(-2.95) 
-.035* 
(-3.59) 
-.048* 
(-6.72) 
-.055* 
(-2.82) 
-.033* 
(-3.95) 
-.040* 
(-6.90) 
-.051* 
(-2.70) 
-.021* 
(-2.99) 
Non-traded 
input share 
.025* 
(2.68) 
.136** 
(2.31) 
.010 
(0.81) 
.048* 
(4.11) 
.089* 
(3.33) 
.036** 
(2.53) 
.058* 
(6.02) 
.074* 
(3.71) 
.057* 
(4.45) 
.041* 
(5.09) 
.062* 
(3.61) 
.021** 
(2.09) 
Large cars .0002 (0.01) 
 
 
-.003 
(-0.21) 
.026*** 
(1.73) 
 
 
.024 
(1.61) 
.102* 
(3.42) 
 
 
.106* 
(3.56) 
.036* 
(2.57) 
 
 
.038* 
(2.70) 
vices -.010 (-0.88) 
 
 
-.010 
(-0.75) 
.035** 
(2.24) 
 
 
.036** 
(2.06) 
.088* 
(2.76) 
 
 
.107* 
(3.31) 
.032** 
(2.33) 
 
 
.050* 
(3.52) 
constant -.007 (-0.28) 
-.376** 
(-1.86) 
-.034 
(-1.16) 
-.067** 
(-2.13) 
-.193** 
(-2.23) 
-.037 
(-1.00) 
-.073* 
(-2.78) 
-.094 
(-1.63) 
-.069** 
(-2.07) 
-.042*** 
(-1.92) 
-.079 
(-1.28) 
.010 
(0.33) 
R2 .08 .14 .10 .08 .09 .09 .09 .06 .11 .08 .05 .06 
R2* .23 .48 .24 .26 .26 .27 .40 .20 .36 .37 .24 .36 
#  of 
observation 289 106 183 356 143 213 814 271 543 823 255 568 
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countries increases so does the absolute price dispersions.  For the differentiated goods 
(Model 3), we can observe that, the impact of distance decreases monotonically through 
the period. The price elasticity of distance estimated as 8.7 percent in 1980, 4.7 percent in 
1985 and 2.9 percent for 1990.  In other words, from 1980 to 1990, price elasticity of 
distance declines almost 70 percent. However, for the homogeneous goods, distance 
coefficient is estimated as 7.5 percent in 1980, and 8.1 percent and 7.3 percent for 1985 
and 1990, respectively.  This finding is consistent with the argument discussed in 
Berthelon and Freund (2004). Improved communication technologies help to reduce the 
search costs which are more important for differentiated goods; nevertheless we do not 
observe a similar trend for the homogeneous goods (Berthelon and Freund, 2004). 
 For both types of goods, real wage rate differences enter as a positive determinant 
of price dispersions. Price elasticity of the real wage rate for homogeneous goods 
estimated as 10 percent in 1980, 8.6 percent in 1985 and 10.4 percent in 1990. Unlike the 
homogeneous goods, the impact of country-specific aspect of the local distribution cost 
for differentiated goods declines monotonically from 1980 to 1990; from 8.8 percent in 
1980 to 6.8 percent in 1985, and finally to 5.3 percent in 1990. This finding also support 
the argument discussed in Berthelon and Freund (2004). Moreover, for all three cross- 
sections, the estimated impact of the real wage rate on absolute price differences is higher 
for homogeneous goods than the differentiated goods. As it was discussed above, since 
most of the homogeneous goods in our sample are bulky and /or perishable commodities, 
we expect them to have higher weight/price ratio compared to differentiated goods.
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Table 3.3 Absolute Price Dispersion with Product Differentiation 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10. The ten countries in 1980 sample are, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. Austria is added in 1985. We have to exclude the Netherlands from 1985 sample because of the insufficient 
number of wage observations. 
 
 
1980 1985 1990 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Population .007* (2.71) 
.006 
(1.29) 
.007** 
(2.43) 
.003*** 
(1.90) 
-.004 
(1.24) 
.006* 
(3.23) 
.005* 
(3.46) 
-.001 
(0.24) 
.008* 
(4.58) 
Wage rate .092* (18.03) 
.100* 
(10.69) 
.088* 
(14.37) 
.075* 
(17.98) 
.086* 
(9.67) 
.068* 
(14.93) 
.067* 
(18.04) 
.104* 
(12.02) 
.053* 
(13.43) 
Distance .083* (22.02) 
.075* 
(10.62) 
.087* 
(19.67) 
.057* 
(16.33) 
.081* 
(11.64) 
.047* 
(11.85) 
.040* 
(15.11) 
.073* 
(12.70) 
.029* 
(9.84) 
Tradability -.082* (-24.62) 
-.086* 
(-7.66) 
-.071* 
(-18.60) 
-.080* 
(-30.41) 
-.072* 
(-7.81) 
-.067* 
(-22.43) 
-.066* 
(-28.82) 
-.095* 
(-11.27) 
-.046* 
(-17.48) 
Non-traded input share .101* (18.48) 
.121* 
(9.68) 
.100* 
(13.64) 
.089* 
(21.40) 
.100* 
(10.70) 
.093* 
(17.18) 
.058* 
(15.48) 
.111* 
(12.86) 
.036* 
(7.76) 
Large cars .147* (7.93)  
.155* 
(8.33) 
.195* 
(7.33)  
.202* 
(7.58) 
.099* 
(9.33)  
.101* 
(9.43) 
Vices .042* (3.28)  
.061* 
(4.51) 
.127* 
(8.16)  
.152* 
(9.62) 
.068* 
(4.54)  
.080* 
(5.27) 
Constant -.593* (-20.01) 
-.564* 
(-9.36) 
-.620* 
(-17.65) 
-.363* 
(-13.57) 
-.504* 
(-8.72) 
-.309* 
(-9.98) 
-.180* 
(-8.67) 
-.544* 
(-10.69) 
-.045*** 
(-1.90) 
R2 .09 .07 .09 .06 .05 .05 .05 .06 .03 
# of observations 20653 6803 13850 36130 10333 25797 45752 11604 34148 
# of countries 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 
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Therefore, trade cost for the homogeneous goods would be higher than that of the 
differentiated goods. 
 Results in Table 3.3 indicate that, both industry-specific aspect of transportation 
cost which is measured by tradability of the good and the country-specific aspect proxied 
by the bilateral distance between countries matter for absolute price dispersions. For both 
types of commodities, tradability has a negative and significant impact on absolute price 
dispersions and as in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, tradeability has larger effect on the 
absolute price dispersions for homogeneous goods. This tells us the same amount of 
increase in tradeability of goods will decrease the price dispersion for homogeneous 
goods more than the differentiated goods. 
The price elasticity of the non-traded input share for homogeneous goods 
estimated precisely, and it is around 10 percent for all three cross-sections. Similarly, the 
non-traded input share has a positive and significant effect on absolute price differences 
for differentiated goods yet decreases monotonically from 10 percent in 1980 to 9.3 
percent in 1985, and finally to 3.6 percent in 1990. We can conclude that both country-
specific and industry-specific aspects of distribution cost are important for the absolute 
price dispersion for the differentiated commodities. 
 For this specification, tax differences are controlled by two dummies: one for 
large cars and the other one for vices. Results in Table 3.3 show that both of the dummies 
also have positive and significant impact on absolute price differences for differentiated 
goods. If a good belongs to the group classified by these dummies, the absolute price 
differences between countries will be larger. 
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 Coefficient estimates of population differences indicate some interesting aspects. 
As it mentioned above we expect markup differences would matter more for 
differentiated goods since the producers of those goods have some pricing power 
depending on the substitutability of the products. We can see from Table 3.3 that for the 
homogeneous goods, for all three years estimated coefficients of population differences 
are statistically indistinguishable than zero. However, price elasticities of population 
differences for differentiated goods are positive and significant across the board.  
 Finally, we add the country and industry specific value added taxes (VAT) 
differences in to the analysis and re-estimate the Equation 3.6.  Before-VAT prices are 
defined as (1 )ij ij ijP P v= +
∼
 where ijP  is the after-VAT price of good i in country j in units 
of numeraire country currency, ijv  is the VAT rate for country j and good i and ijP
∼
 is the 
before-VAT price of good i in country j. VAT rates are unavailable for Greece, Spain and 
Portugal for the cross-sections except 1990.  So, there are only seven countries with VAT 
rates for 1980 and 1985 and that makes it harder to get reliable results. Therefore, we 
estimate the specification with before-VAT prices only for year 1990 for which all 11 
countries in our data have the VAT rates. Results are presented in Table 3.4. 
 As before results for the pooled data are presented in Model 1, Model 2 and 
Model 3 show the results for homogeneous and differentiated goods, respectively. For all 
three models, the coefficient estimates of the country-specific potential determinants of 
the absolute price differences virtually unchanged in the specifications without the VAT 
reported in Table 3.3. Coefficient estimates of tradability with before-VAT prices change 
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to -10.2 percent from -9.5 percent for differentiated goods and to -4.6 percent from -4 
percent for homogeneous goods.  For both types of commodities, the price elasticity of 
the non-traded input content of the good nearly unchanged with the inclusion of VAT. 
Finally, the two dummies have positive and significant impact on the absolute price 
differences for differentiated goods as we anticipated. 
 Moreover, we can see that the results hold the established relation between 
homogeneous goods and differentiated goods. Coefficient estimates for country-specific 
transportation cost and industry-specific aspect of the transportation cost are higher for 
homogeneous goods. Similarly, country-specific and industry-specific distribution cost 
matter more for homogeneous goods relative to differentiated goods. Finally, as in Table 
3.3, impact of population differences on absolute price dispersions is statistically 
indistinguishable than zero for homogeneous goods whereas it is positive and significant 
for differentiated goods. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 In this chapter we attempt to explain the effect of market structure on 
international price dispersions. In order to characterize the market structure, we use the 
commodity classification proposed by Rauch (1999). In this classification, Rauch (1999) 
categorized the internationally traded commodities as commodities traded in organized 
exchanges, goods those are not traded in organized exchanges but possess a reference 
price and differentiated goods. Each good in our price data is assigned one of the good 
categories defined by Rauch (1999). Since having a reference price distinguishes 
homogeneous   goods   from    differentiated    goods,    commodities traded in organized  
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Table 3.4 Absolute Price Dispersion with Product Differentiation and with VAT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10. The ten countries in 1990 sample are, Austria, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK.  
 
and reference priced goods are combined as homogeneous goods. Then we estimate two 
specifications in order to assess the impact of market structure on international price 
differences. 
Our departure point for the first specification is the model discussed in CTZ.  We 
attempt to explain the effect of good-specific characteristics used by CTZ on the good-
by-good price dispersions for homogeneous goods and differentiated goods separately. 
 1990 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Population .005* (3.51) 
.002 
(0.43) 
.007* 
(4.16) 
Wage rate .069* (18.91) 
.106* 
(12.52) 
.056* 
(14.13) 
Distance .041* (15.57) 
.073* 
(12.72) 
.030* 
(10.41) 
Tradability -.061* (-26.46) 
-.102* 
(-12.12) 
-.040* 
(-15.18) 
Non-traded input share .051* (13.80) 
.114* 
(13.20) 
.031* 
(6.80) 
Large cars .124* (11.61)  
.126* 
(11.66) 
vices .054* (3.77)  
.068* 
(4.66) 
constant -.174* (-8.41) 
-.573* 
(-11.30) 
-.044*** 
(-1.88) 
R2 .05 .07 .03 
# of observations 45752 11604 34148 
# of countries 11 11 11 
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Our second specification originated from the theoretical model discussed in Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2004). Model describes the transportation cost, distribution cost, and 
differences in taxes and markups as potential determinants of international price 
dispersion. As in Chapter 2, we utilize physical distance between the countries as a 
measure of transportation cost, industry specific real wage rates as a measure of local 
distribution cost, and population differences as a measure of markup differences. Tax 
differences are controlled by two dummy variables for vices and large cars, and where 
broadly available by VAT rates. In order to control the heterogeneity across industries in 
transportation and distribution costs, we also utilize industry-specific variables tradability 
and the non-traded input share of the final good. Our results indicate that i) in both 
specifications, price elasticity of tradability and the non-traded input share estimated 
higher for homogeneous goods. This finding confirms our expectations, since the pricing 
decision of differentiated goods is a multidimensional issue; it depends on the elasticity 
of substitution between the available variety of product, preferences as well as the trade. 
Moreover since most of the homogeneous goods are bulky and/or perishable items, 
distribution costs are also higher for them. ii) Country specific measure of distribution 
cost is estimated significantly for both commodity groups, and we have higher estimates 
for homogeneous goods.  iii) Country specific aspects of transportation cost distance, is 
estimated positive and significant for both types of products, and higher for homogeneous 
goods than differentiated goods. Furthermore, the price elasticity of distance decreases 
monotonically over the period for differentiated goods, but it remains almost constant for 
homogeneous goods. This result is parallel with the argument made by Barthelon and 
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Freund (2004) and Rauch (1999) that the decrease in search cost over the years affect the 
differentiated goods more than the homogeneous goods. It should also be noted that 
Bergstarnd and Egger (forthcoming) reached the same conclusion by using cif/fob ratios 
as a proxy for transportation cost instead of bilateral distance .iv) Finally, markup 
differences are more important for  differentiated goods. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation work set out to investigate the reasons behind the international 
price dispersion.  Crucini. Telmer and Zachariadis (2005) state that “theory places much 
starker restrictions on LOP deviations than on their changes”, and the gap between theory 
and empirics can be bridged through the use of microeconomic price levels. However due 
to data limitations most empirical work has examined the time-series distribution of 
international relative prices. This dissertation addressed this issue by utilizing a unique 
and comprehensive dataset on absolute LOP deviations that enabled us to make cross-
sectional comparison of the price of the same good.  
The comparison of prices across countries is one of the several ways of 
investigating market integration. Because of costly trade markets do not integrate 
completely (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2005).  Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) argue that 
trade costs have economically sensible magnitudes and patterns across countries and 
across goods, suggesting useful hypotheses for a deeper understanding of them. Since 
direct measures of trade costs are usually sparse and inaccurate, using indirect measures 
as a complement is inevitable (Anderson and van Wincoop 2004). 
Price levels of individual goods provide indirect information about trade costs. 
However the literature on inference about trade costs from final goods prices remains 
largely devoid theory; therefore some theoretical background on this literature will help 
us learn more about trade costs from evidence on prices (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2004). The first essay on this dissertation, “International Price Dispersion and Direction 
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of Trade” adds to the existing literature by empirically testing the theoretical model 
discussed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). According to the “theoretical 
background” discussed in this work, in order to assess trade costs from price levels, the 
source country needs to be identified for each product. In order to succeed, we have used 
two different approaches. In our first approach, productivity levels of countries were used 
as a factor which determines the source country. Based on Eaton and Kortum (2001), 
Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Eaton, Bernard, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) we have used 
the most productive country in each industry as a reference country. As a second 
approach, we utilized bilateral trade flows in order to compute price levels in the 
hypothetical exporter country. In both specifications, bilateral distance between the 
probable source and the destination country were employed as a measure of 
transportation costs. When the most productive country was used as a reference country, 
estimated coefficients of distance improved. Moreover, results obtained from the 
specification which uses productivity as a determinant of the source country are 
qualitatively very similar to ones obtained from the second specification which uses the 
information from real trade partners. This finding indicated that productivity is a strong 
predictor of the direction of trade.  
Results also demonstrated that, the other potential determinants discussed in 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), local distribution costs, taxes, and markup 
differences also have significant impact on international price dispersion. Overall, we 
could conclude that the data was consistent with the models where transportation cost, 
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local distribution costs, market size, and tax differences play significant roles in the 
determination of international price dispersion. 
There is a growing interest on the role of market structure in explaining LOP 
deviations. The second essay, “International Price Dispersion and Market Structure” has 
discussed the effect of market structure on international price differences. More 
specifically, we categorized goods as homogeneous goods and differentiated goods by 
using the well-known Rauch commodity classification, and have investigated the impact 
of determinants of price dispersion for these categories separately. The first specification 
based on the model discussed in CTZ. According to this model, tradeability of the good 
and its non-traded input content largely explain LOP deviations. For the second 
specification we have used the theoretical model in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), 
Results of both models demonstrated that transportation and local distribution costs, both 
in country-specific and industry-specific levels, have larger impact on the absolute price 
dispersion for homogeneous goods. Furthermore, the monotonically decreasing impact of 
distance we observed for the full sample could be observed only for differentiated goods. 
In sum, our results confirmed the argument in Berthelon and Freund (2004) and Rauch 
(1999): Decrease in search cost over the period has affected price dispersion of 
differentiated goods more than homogeneous goods. 
Finally, market size appeared to be more important for the differentiated goods. It 
can be concluded that there are vast differences in elasticities of the determinants of price 
dispersion across different types of goods. Further studies should include this issue into 
the analysis. 
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In summary, the results in this dissertation show that our data is consistent with 
the theoretical model according to which international price differences are largely 
determined by trade costs, taxes and markups. As Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) 
suggested, the death of distance is exaggerated; both international trade costs and local 
distribution cost are large and there is an important relation between trade costs and 
market structure. 
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APPENDIX A DATA 
Table A1 Industry Availability of the TFP Level Data 
Industry Description ISIC 
 
 
Food Products 311 
Beverages 313 
Tobacco 314 
Textiles 321 
Wearing apparel except footwear 322 
Leather products 323 
Footwear except rubber or plastic 324 
Furniture except metal 332 
Paper and products 341 
Printing and publishing 342 
Other chemicals 352 
Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 354 
Rubber products 355 
Glass and products 362 
Other non-metallic mineral products 369 
Iron and steel 371 
Non-ferrous metal 372 
Fabricated metal products 381 
Machinery except electrical 382 
Machinery electric 383 
Transport equipment 384 
Professional and scientific equipment 385 
Other manufactured products 390 
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Table A2 Availability of the Import Flows Data 
Industry Description ISIC 
Meat and meat preparations 3111 
Dairy products and bird’s eggs 3112 
Vegetables and fruits 3113 
Fish, crustaceans, mollucs, preparations thereof 3114 
Margarine, imitate.lard, and other prepared edible fats 3115 
Fixed vegetable oils and fats 3115 
Cereal and cereal preparations 3116 
Macaroni, spaghetti, and similar products 3117 
Bakery products 3117 
Sugar and honey 3118 
Sugar confectionary and other sugar preparations 3119 
Cocoa 3119 
Chocolate and other food preparations containing cocoa 3119 
Coffee and coffee substitutes 3121 
Tea 3121 
Spices 3121 
Edible products and preparations n.e.s 3121 
Alcoholic beverages 3133 
Non alcoholic beverages n.e.s 3134 
Tobacco and tobacco manufactures  3140 
Textile fibres (except wool tops) and their wastes 3210 
Textile yarn, fabrics, made.up articles, related products 3210 
Articles of apparel and clothing accesories 3220 
Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s 3230 
Footware 3240 
Furniture and parts thereof 3320 
Pulp and waste paper 
 3410 
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(cont.) 
 
Paper, paperboard, articles of paper, paper pulp/board 3410 
Registers, exercise books, notebooks etc. 3420 
Printed matter 3420 
Artificial resins, plastic materials, cellulose esters and ethers 3513 
Dyeing, tanning, and coloring materials  3521 
Essential oils and perfume materials; toilet polishing and cleaning preparations 3523 
Chemical materials and products n.e.s 3529 
Coal coke and briquettes 3540 
Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials 3540 
Rubber manufactures n.e.s 3550 
Other artificial plastic materials, n.e.s 3560 
Combs, hair slides and the like 3560 
Glassware 3620 
Clay construct. Materials and refractory construct. materials 3691 
Portlan cement, cement fondu, slag cement etc.. 3692 
Nails, screws, nuts, bolts,etc iron and steel 3710 
Aluminum foils, of a thickness not exceeding 20 mm. 3720 
Other tools for use in hand 3811 
Cutlery 3811 
Office machines and automatic data processing equipment 3825 
Sewing machines, furniture for sewing machines and parts 3829 
Household type refrigerators and freezers 3829 
Telecommunications and sound recording apparatus  3832 
Gramophone records, recorded tapes etc.. 3832 
Household type electrical and non electrical equipment 3833 
Electrical app. such as switches, relays, fuses, plugs etc.. 3839 
Batteries and accumulators and parts 3839 
Filament lamps, no infrared ultraviolet lamps 3839 
Int combustion piston engines for outboard prop. 3841 
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(cont.) 
Passenger motorcars, for transport of passengers and goods 3843 
Motorcycles, motorscooters, invalid carriages 3844 
Photographic apparatus, optical goods, watches 3850 
Medical instruments and appliances 3850 
Orthopedic appliances, surgical belts 3850 
Pins and needles, fittings, based metal beeds etc. 3900 
Children’s toys, indoor games 3900 
Other sporting goods and fairground amusement 3900 
Pens, pencils, and fountain pens 3900 
Jewelry, goldsmiths and other art. of precious metals 3900 
Musical instruments, parts and accessories 3900 
Mechanical lighters and parts 3900 
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Table A3 Sample of Goods with Rauch Classification Codes
SITC GOOD DESCRIPTION RAUCH 
CODE 
111 Beef, fresh-blade-bone steak w 
111 Pork-fresh, belly w 
116 Pig Liver, fresh w 
116 Tongue of beef-fresh w 
240 Processed cheese w 
350 Dried cod-salted w 
422 Long grained rice-in plastic bag w 
577 Peanuts-in plastic bag w 
585 Apple juice-natural, in carton w 
   
114 Turkey-frozen (15 to 18 weeks old) r 
142 Mortadella r 
142 Cocktail sausages-tinned r 
223 Natural yoghourt r 
371 Tuna fish-in oil r 
460 Flaked oats-without vitamis r 
589 Fruit-based baby food r 
6415 Box of paper handkerchief: double r 
7781 Dry battery: r6 r 
   
483 Spaghetti-without eggs n 
619 Caramel sweets n 
1110 Orange soda-sparkling, selected brand n 
1222 Cigarettes, light, with filter, selected brand n 
5530 Perfume, selected brand n 
6973 Pressure cooker: selected brand n 
7751 Washing machine: 5 kg., selected brand n 
7810 Motor car: engine of 1700 cc or over, selected brand n 
8510 Mans sport shoes, selected brand n 
Note: w: goods traded in organized exchanges, r: reference priced goods, n: differentiated  goods 
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Figure A1 Empirical Distributions of Var(qij|j)1/2 
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Figure A1.1 Pooled Data                      Figure A1.2 Homogeneous Goods              Figure A1.3 Differentiated Goods 
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Figure A1.4 Pooled Data                      Figure A1.5 Homogeneous Goods            Figure A1.6 Differentiated Goods       
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  Figure A1.7 Pooled Data                           Figure A1.8 Homogeneous Goods           Figure A1.9 Differentiated Goods 
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Figure A1.10 Pooled Data                          Figure A1.11 Homogeneous Goods         Figure A1.12 Differentiated Goods 
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Figure A2 Empirical Distributions of LOP Deviations 
 
1975 
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        Figure A2.1 Germany             Figure A2.2 Denmark           Figure A2.3 France           Figure A2.4 United Kingdom 
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   Figure A2.5 Ireland                   Figure A2.6 Italy                     Figure A2.7 Netherlands          Figure A2.8 Belgium 
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Figure A2.9 Germany                 Figure A2.10 Denmark          Figure A2.11 Spain                Figure A2.12 France 
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Figure A2.10 United Kingdom     Figure A2.11 Greece              Figure A2.12 Ireland              Figure A2.13 Italy 
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FigureA2.14 Netherlands                             Figure A2.15 Portugal                            Figure A2.16 Belgium 
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    Figure A2.17 Austria             Figure A2.18 Germany            Figure A2.19 Denmark          Figure A2.20 Spain 
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   Figure A2.21 France            Figure A2.22 United Kingdom       Figure A2.23 Greece             Figure A2.24 Ireland 
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     Figure A2.25 Italy                Figure A2.26 Netherlands       Figure A2.27 Portugal              Figure A2.28 Belgium 
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   Figure A2.29 Austria             Figure A2.30 Germany             Figure A2.31 Denmark           Figure A2.32 Spain 
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Figure A2.33 France               Figure A2.34 United Kingdom     Figure A2.35 Greece          Figure A2.36 Ireland 
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Figure A2.37 Italy                    Figure A2.37 Netherlands       Figure A2.38 Portugal             Figure A2.39 Belgium 
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Figure A3 Empirical Distributions of LOP Deviations for Homogeneous Goods 
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Figure A3.1 Germany             Figure A3.2 Denmark             Figure A3.3 France                 Figure A3.4 United Kingdom 
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Figure A3.5 Ireland                     Figure A3.6 Italy                    Figure A3.7 Netherlands          Figure A3.8 Belgium 
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Figure A3.9 Germany             Figure A3.10 Denmark                Figure A3.11 Spain                   Figure A3.12 France 
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Figure A3.13 United Kingdom      Figure A3.14 Greece             Figure A3.15 Ireland               Figure A3.16 Italy 
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Figure A3.17 Netherlands                       Figure A3.18 Portugal                             Figure A3.19 Belgium 
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Figure A3.20 Austria               Figure A3.21 Germany             Figure A3.22 Denmark          Figure A3.23 Spain 
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Figure A3.24 France             Figure A3.25 United Kingdom        Figure A3.25 Greece              Figure A3.26 Ireland 
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Figure A3.27 Italy                    Figure A3.28 Netherlands     Figure A3.29 Portugal               Figure A3.30 Belgium 
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Figure A3.31 Austria               Figure A3.32 Germany             Figure A3.33 Denmark      Figure A3.34 Spain 
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Figure A3.35 France            Figure A3.36 United Kingdom      Figure A3.37 Greece             Figure A3.38 Ireland 
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Figure A3.39 Italy                   Figure A3.40 Netherlands        Figure A3.41 Portugal           Figure A3.42 Belgium 
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Figure A4 Empirical Distributions of LOP Deviations for Differentiated Goods 
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Figure A4.1 Germany             Figure A4.2 Denmark              Figure A4.3 France                 Figure A4.4 United Kingdom 
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Figure A4.5 Ireland                      Figure A4.6 Italy                    Figure A4.7 Netherlands          Figure A4.8 Belgium 
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Figure A4.9 Germany            Figure A4.10 Denmark             Figure A4.11 Spain               Figure A4.12 France 
 
 
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
d16
    
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
-2 -1 0 1 2
d17
   
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
-.5 0 .5 1
d18
  
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
d19
 
Figure A4.13 United Kingdom     Figure A4.14 Greece            Figure A4.15 Ireland              Figure A4.16 Italy 
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Figure A4.17 Netherlands                                Figure A4.18 Portugal                         Figure A4.19 Belgium 
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Figure A4.20 Austria                Figure A4.21 Germany          Figure A4.22 Denmark            Figure A4.23 Spain 
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Figure A4.24 France             Figure A4.25 United Kingdom     Figure A4.26 Greece             Figure A4.27 Ireland 
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Figure A4.28 Italy                    Figure A4.29 Netherlands      Figure A4.30 Portugal            Figure A4.31 Belgium 
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Figure A4.32 Austria              Figure A4.33 Germany             Figure A4.34 Denmark           Figure A4.35 Spain 
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Figure A4.36 France              Figure A4.37 United Kingdom         Figure A4.38 Greece            Figure A4.39 Ireland 
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(cont.) 
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Figure A4.40 Italy                     Figure A4.41 Netherlands      Figure A4.42 Portugal             Figure A4.43 Belgium 
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APPENDIX B CONSTRUCTION OF THE CAPITAL STOCK FOR EACH 
INDUSTRY 
  
The Database on Investment and Capital for Agriculture and Manufacturing 
reports the total capital stock for the manufacturing sector (TK). In order to calculate 
capital stock for each manufacturing industry, we assume that the share of investment for 
the industry in total manufacturing for specific year is equal to its share of the capital 
stock. We calculate total manufacturing sector investment by using capital formation data 
for 28 manufacturing industries, and then obtain each industry’s share of total 
manufacturing for each country. However, since some countries have missing 
observations for some industries the shares of the remaining industries are overestimated. 
In order to resolve this problem, we use the following approach for each cross-section:  
Let us denote maxI  as total investment in the manufacturing sector for countries 
that have no missing values. Then, the industries that have missing investment values for 
at least one country are excluded and the sum of capital formation for the remaining 
industries is denoted for each country j as jI . We now define 
1
max
1 N j
j
IFraction IN =
 
=
 
 
∑
 
where N is the number of countries that are used to calculate maxI . We assume this 
fraction is the same for countries that have missing capital formation data for one or more 
industries. Then for each industry h and country j, we define hjhj
hj
I
weight N= . If a 
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country has missing data, then the share of capital stock for each industry h is defined as 
[ ]*hj jshare TK Fraction =
 
 and its capital stock is now given by 
*hj hj hjK weight share= . 
If the country does not have missing data then we assume the share of investment for 
each industry is simply equal to its share in the capital stock given as max
max
hj
hj
hjIshare I=  
and then its capital stock is given by 
max* hjhj jK TK share  =  
 
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APPENDIX C RESULTS FOR ARBITRARY REFERENCE COUNTRY 
COMPARISONS 
 
 
 
Table C1 Germany as a Reference Country 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10. In Model 2 we take absolute values for all variables. 
In Model 3 we use the mean of absolute LOP deviations. The eight countries considered here are: Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and the UK. 
 
 
1985 1990 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Population -.060* (-9.89) 
-.001 
(-0.19) 
.008 
(0.55) 
-.068* 
(-10.72) 
-.011** 
(-2.00) 
.009 
(0.53) 
GDP per-capita .395* (8.05) 
.046 
(0.87) 
-.017 
(-0.12) 
.835* 
(11.68) 
.416* 
(6.13) 
.260 
(1.55) 
Distance .042 (1.48) 
.093* 
(4.06) 
.144** 
(2.18) 
.267* 
(7.40) 
-.093* 
(-3.38) 
.040 
(0.61) 
Tradability  .011 (0.85) 
-.015 
(-0.69)  
-.057* 
(-4.44) 
-.043 
(-1.36) 
Non-traded input share  .003* (2.60) 
.005** 
(2.26)  
.001 
(0.67) 
.003 
(0.68) 
Large cars  .266* (4.02)   
.169* 
(4.92)  
Vices  .143* (6.11) 
.089*** 
(1.83)  
.135* 
(5.76) 
.095** 
(1.98) 
Constant .037*** (2.33) 
.281* 
(15.87) 
.285* 
(6.32) 
.047* 
(3.09) 
.261* 
(11.73) 
.251* 
(4.30) 
R2(in percentage) 4.5 4.8 17.3 5.7 5.7 23.2 
Observations 4244 4244 161 3567 3567 133 
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Table C2 United Kingdom as a Reference Country 
 
 
Note: *p-value< 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < .10. In Model 2 we take absolute values for all variables. 
In Model 3 we use the mean of absolute LOP deviations. The eight countries considered here are: Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and the UK. 
 
 
 
 
1985 1990 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Population -.064* (-10.18) 
-.011*** 
(-1.79) 
-.019 
(-1.21) 
-.047* 
(-6.81) 
.004 
(0.52) 
.006 
(-0.31) 
GDP per-capita .278* (9.26) 
.137* 
(3.46) 
.275** 
(2.30) 
.379* 
(9.61) 
-.055 
(-0.99) 
.215 
(1.40) 
Distance -.004 (-0.31) 
.115* 
(12.51) 
.158* 
(5.75) 
.034** 
(2.27) 
.109* 
(9.37) 
.107* 
(2.68) 
Tradability  -.042** (-2.48) 
-.054** 
(-1.96)  
-.030*** 
(-1.81) 
-.007 
(-0.21) 
Non-traded input share  .005* (3.96) 
.006*** 
(1.93)  
.003 
(1.51) 
.008*** 
(1.84) 
Large cars  .097*** (1.84)   
.035 
(1.28)  
Vices  .131* (4.43) 
.097** 
(2.16)  
.128* 
(4.22) 
.147* 
(2.98) 
Constant .027*** (2.32) 
.297* 
(15.20) 
.287* 
(6.58) 
.108* 
(8.47) 
.336* 
(13.17) 
.199* 
(3.24) 
R2(in percentage) 3.2 5.1 29.0 3.4 4.7 21.0 
Observations 4184 4184 160 2834 2834 130 
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VITA 
 
 
Ozlem Inanc was born near Waldbroll, Germany, on May 6, 1975. She is the 
daughter of Yildiz Inanc and Husnu Inanc and is the younger sister of Oner T. Inanc.  
Ozlem Inanc was raised in Eskisehir, a vivid Anatolian city within the heartland, some 
one hundred miles southwest of the Turkish capital Ankara. In 1995, she graduated high 
school from Eskisehir Fatih Fen Lisesi (Eskisehir Science Branch High School). In 1999, 
she graduated from Hacettepe University, in the Turkish capital Ankara, with a Bachelor 
of Arts degree in economics as the valedictorian of her class. Later on she received a 
Master of Science degree from the same university in 2001. She also holds a Master of 
Science degree from Louisiana State University which was awarded to her in 2003. She 
received her Doctor of Philosophy degree in economics from Louisiana State University 
in May 2007. 
 
